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DISSECTING THE STATE: THE USE OF
FEDERAL LAW TO FREE STATE AND
LO CAL OFFICIALS FROM STATE
LEGISLATURES' CONTROL
Roderick M. Hills, Jr.*
In discussions about American federalism, it is common to
speak of a "state government" as if it were a black box, an individ
ual speaking with a single voice.1 State governments are, of course,
no such thing. Rather, a "state" actually incorporates a bundle of
different subdivisions, branches, and agencies controlled by politi
cians who often compete with each other for electoral success and
governmental power. In particular, these institutions compete with
each other for the power to control federal funds and implement
federal programs.2
This article explores one aspect of this intrastate competition the extent to which federal law can delegate federal powers to spe
cific state or local institutions even against the will of the state legis
lature.3 Must the federal government take state institutions as it
finds them, or can it expand these institutions' powers even in the
teeth of state laws that seem to bar the institutions from exercising
such federally derived powers?
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1987, J.D. 1991, Yale. - Ed.
gratefully acknowledge the comments of Matt Adler, Lynn Baker, Richard Briffault, Evan
Caminker, Richard Friedman, Clayton Gillette, John Harrison, Michael Heller, Don Herzog,
Kyle Logue, Larry Kramer, and Rick Pildes on drafts of this article. I also thank the partici
pants of a works-in-progress workshop at the University of Texas Law School and the general
faculty workshop at NYU Law School for their suggestions. Fmally, I thank Jordan Hansell
for exceptional editorial assistance.
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1. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, Turning Federalism Inside Out: Intrastate Aspects of Inter
state Regulatory Competition, 14 YALE L. & POLY. REv. 149, 155 (1996).
2. For a discussion of such competition, see Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy
of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty"
Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REv. 813, 875-86 (1998).
3. In the interest of conserving space, I will not discuss the ways in which judicially
imposed remedies such as consent decrees might be used to expand the powers of state or
local agencies or officers. The effect of judicial orders and decrees on state or local officers'
powers, however, is closely related to the issues raised in this article. In Missouri v. Jenkins,
495 U.S. 33 (1990), for instance, the Supreme Court held that a federal district court could
desegregate public schools by authorizing the school district - nominally a defendant in the
litigation - to raise property taxes in excess of the millage limits contained in the state
constitution. By allowing such a remedy for a constitutional violation, the Court effectively
allowed a federal district court to dissect the state by liberating a subdivision of a state from
the control of state law.
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Such an issue can arise in two contexts. First, Congress or a
federal agency might simply delegate powers to some nonfederal
governmental institution created by state law - say, a city-while
state law might prohibit the nonfederal institution from exercising
such powers. For instance, the City of Tacoma and the State of
Washington became entangled in a lengthy power struggle during
the 1950s when the Federal Power Commission licensed the city to
build a dam on the Cowlitz River, a tributary of the Columbia
River. The State of Washington sought to prevent the construction
of the dam to protect state-owned hatcheries from being flooded.
Washington invoked a state law barring the city from constructing
the proposed dam, but Tacoma successfully argued before the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit that its federal license pre
empted state law.4 In effect, the city -a creature of the state had invoked federal law to defeat the will of the state government,
its creator.
The federal government, however, rarely attempts so crudely to
override state law. Instead, the issue of nonfederal officials' feder
ally derived powers typically arises more subtly in the context of
ambiguous federal grants. When the federal government bestows
federal grants-in-aid on some category of state or local officials say, county commissions or the governor of a state - the state leg
islature sometimes attempts to appropriate the revenue in order to
control how it is allocated, either by directly ordering the federal
money to be spent according to state priorities or by reducing state
aid by the amount of the federal grant, thus effectively converting
federal funds to state purposes. In response to these conversion
attempts, federal grant law may then give the initial recipient the
power to resist the state legislature's attempt to appropriate or off
set the federal funds. The question then arises: Who controls the
federal money?
For instance, at issue in Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood
School District5 was Congress's bestowal of federal funds on county
governments to compensate them for tax losses resulting from the
presence of federally owned, tax-exempt land (national parks, for
4. See Washington Dept. of Grune v. Federal Power Commn., 207 F.2d 391, 396 (9th Cir.
1953). The Washington Supreme Court reached a different conclusion in City of Tacoma v.
Taxpayers of Tacoma, 262 P.2d 214, 229 (Wash. 1953) [hereinafter City of Tacoma I], a deci
sion that the U.S. Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that it was precluded by the Ninth
Circuit's earlier decision of the same issue, see City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 357
U.S. 320, 340 (1958) [hereinafter City of Tacoma Ill]. I discuss this convoluted controversy at
infra notes 19-22 and accompanying text and infra section III.A.
5. 469 U.S. 256 (1985).
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instance) located within their boundaries. To control this federal
money, the South Dakota legislature had enacted a statute requir
ing the county to pay over sixty percent of the federal revenues to
the local school district.6 The county, however, successfully argued
that the federal grant preempted state law by giving the county un
fettered and final authority to dispose of the federal revenue as it
chose.7
A similar conflict arises when state legislatures attempt to ap
propriate federal grant revenue that has been awarded by the fed
eral government to the governor. Several state supreme courts
have wrestled with the question of whether state legislatures may
appropriate such federal funds. Invoking state constitutional sepa
ration of powers doctrine, some state courts have held that the state
legislature cannot exercise appropriation power over the money, at
least absent clear federal authorization for such appropriation.8
This article attempts to answer the thorny constitutional and
statutory questions that arise whenever the federal government
uses either its regulatory power or its spending power to dissect the
state, unpacking the black box of "the state" to liberate certain
state or local institutions from the control of state laws. Should
Congress be permitted to insulate local governments and state
agencies from the control of the state legislature through preemp
tive regulatory legislation? And when Congress uses its spending
power to dissect the state, how should courts construe ambiguities
in the grant programs? Should courts construe federal statutes and
state constitutions to protect the freedom of the state's subparts its local governments, agencies, governor, etc. -from the centraliz
ing power of the state legislature? To retard it and encourage legis
lative control? Or is there no intelligible way to generalize about
these institutional questions across different grant programs?
As Part I of this article explains, neither precedent nor policy
provides any clear guidance on these issues. Many courts and com
mentators seem to assume without argument that the federal gov
ernment may not bestow powers on local governments when those
powers are forbidden by the relevant state statutory or constitu6. See S.D. CODIFIED LAws §5-11-6 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1998).
7. See Lawrence County, 469 U.S. at 269. I discuss Lawrence County at infra notes 104-19
and accompanying text.
8. See Navajo Tribe v. Arizona Dept. of Admin., 528 P.2d 623' (Ariz. 1975); Mac Manus v.
Love, 499 P.2d 609 (Colo. 1972); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 378 N.E.2d 433 (Mass.
1978); State ex reL Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 524 P.2d 975 (N.M. 1974). I discuss these cases in
more detail at infra notes 155-156 and accompanying text.
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tional law.9 Under this theory, mayors, governors, city councils, or
county commissions can act as the agents of the federal government
only if state law does not forbid it. I call this view the "principle of
state supremacy."

Notwithstanding conventional opinion to the

contrary, there are no precedents from either the Supreme Court or
any lower court explaining why or even whether the principle of
state supremacy is actually part of established constitutional doc
trine. As I argue in section I.A, one can make colorable arguments
that the principle of state supremacy is implied by the Court's "state
autonomy" precedents such as New York v. United States10 and
Printz v. United States. 11 But these are merely plausible arguments,
and there are plausible arguments on the other side.
Considerations of sensible policy also do not unambiguously re
solve this impasse in the precedents. On one hand, there is a re
spectable argument (which I lay out in section 1.B) that the
principle of state supremacy helps promote cost-effective and politi
cally accountable local governance. Congress is probably not as
well-suited for designing institutions for local governance as state
legislatures.

But, on the other hand, the principle of state

supremacy has costs as well as benefits: it could conceivably pose a
threat to cooperative federalism.12 As I suggest in section l.C, the
danger of state supremacy is that state laws might inefficiently pre
vent nonfederal officials and institutions - governors and state leg
islatures, counties, cities, special districts, and other state agencies
-from competing with each other for federal funds. This intergov
ernmental competition is useful, because it allows Congress to by
pass nonfederal officials who fail to implement federal policy
faithfully and instead to delegate power to other nonfederal offi
cials who demonstrate greater fidelity to federal policies. But such
intergovernmental competition vanishes if the principle of state
supremacy allows the state legislature to centralize the structure of
state government and bar nonfederal officials from implementing
federal policy.
9. See infra note 21.
10. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
11. 521 U.S. 98 (1997).
12. "Cooperative federalism" refers to intergovernmental cooperation between the fed
eral and state or local governments, under which nonfederal officials implement federal pol
icy, frequently receiving federal grant revenue in return. For general accounts of such
intergovernmental relations, see TIMOTHY CONLAN, NEW FEDERALISM: INTERGOVERNMEN·
TAL REFORM FROM NIXON TO REAGAN (1988); DAVID WALKER, THE REBIRTii OF FEDER
ALISM: SLOUCHING TOWARD WASHINGTON (1995); DEIL S. WRIGHT, UNDERSTANDING
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS (3d ed. 1988).
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The question, therefore, arises whether there is some mecha
nism by which the costs and benefits of the principle of state
supremacy might be correctly balanced. In Part II, I propose such a
device - a canon of construction that I shall call "the presumption
of institutional autonomy." Federal grant programs and state stat
utes and constitutions are frequently ambiguous about the role of
the state legislature in controlling access to state and local institu
tions. The presumption of institutional autonomy instructs courts
to construe this ambiguity to maximize the ability of state and local
governmental institutions to spend such federal revenue free from
state legislative supervision. The presumption of institutional au
tonomy preserves federal access to nonfederal officials by allowing
these officials to carry·out federal policies absent a clear statement
to the contrary in state laws. Such a "plain statement" rule is analo
gous to federal-preserving canons of construction used in decisions
like Gregory v. Ashcroft.13 The plain statement rule in Gregory
protects federalism through the national political process by barring
federal intrusions into state sovereignty absent a clear congressional
statement to the contrary.14 Likewise the presumption of institu
tional autonomy protects nationalism through the state political pro
cess by barring state intrusion into federal intergovernmental
relations absent a clear state-law provision to the contrary.15

In Part II, I explore how such a presumption might affect the
judicial construction of federal grants to local governments16 and
govemors.17 Finally, in Part ID, I explore whether the presumption
of institutional autonomy might be used to protect local govern
ments from state control outside the context of federal grant pro
grams. The article examines two famous cases - Bridgeport's
petition for bankruptcy, which was resisted by Connecticut's state
government,18 and the City of Tacoma's effort to build a dam on the
Cowlitz River, which was resisted by Washington's state govem
ment19 - to explore whether the federal government should be
13. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
14. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 461.
15. For a general account of how canons of statutory construction might be viewed as
devices for advancing important polices or constitutional values, see William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1007 (1989).
16. See infra section II.B.1.
17. See infra section II.B.2.
18. See In re City of Bridgeport, 128 B.R. 688 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991).
19. The litigation surrounding the Cowlitz dam was convoluted and protracted, involving
one decision by the Ninth Circuit, four decisions by the Washington Supreme Court, and one
decision by the U.S. Supreme Court. See Washington Dept. of Game v. Federal Power
Commn., 207 F.2d 391 (9th Cir. 1953); City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 371 P.2d 938
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permitted to bestow powers on cities using regulations rather than
grants.
J.

THE PRESUMPTION OF STATE SUPREMACY:

PROMOTING INTERGOVERNMENTAL COMPETITION
THROUGH LIMITS ON FEDERAL POWER
As a matter of either precedent or sensible policy, what sort of
role should the federal government play in defining the powers of
nonfederal governmental institutions? Courts and commentators
frequently suggest without much elaboration that Congress simply
cannot authorize state or local officials to perform acts forbidden by
state law.20 I call this theory the "principle of state supremacy."
The difficulty with this theory is that it is impossible to make an
unambiguous determination of whether support exists for this prin
ciple in either precedent or policy.
As I explain in section I.A, the Supreme Court has never clearly
embraced the principle that the federal government cannot dissect
the state and liberate state and local officials from the state legisla
ture's control. Considerations of sensible policy might provide a
stronger basis for a rule against dissection of the state: as explained
in section I.B, there are good reasons to believe that when Congress
dissects the state and liberates state or local officials from the con
straints of state law, Congress weakens those institutions for the
purpose of local self-governance.

By "local self-governance," I

mean the cost-effective delivery of local public goods in a manner
that is politically accountable to local residents. Congress is simply
not as well-suited as the states for creating institutions that deliver
local public goods to the residents of a state in a politically account
able and cost-effective way. Therefore, one might insist on the prin
ciple of state supremacy as a way to protect nonfederal institutions
from being undermined by ill-advised federal efforts to liberate
them from state law.
But even this policy-based defense of the principle must be
qualified: section I.C explains, the principle of state supremacy has
costs as well as benefits. It is conceivable that the principle of state
supremacy might lead to greater centralization of the state, thereby
increasing the state government's capacity to engage in strategic be(Wash. 1962) (hereinafter City of Tacoma IV]; City of Tacoma v. Taxpayers of Tacoma, 307
P.2d 567 (Wash. 1957) (hereinafter City of Tacoma 11], revd., City of Tacoma III, supra note 4,
357 U.S. 320 (1958); City of Tacoma I, supra note 4, 262 P.2d 214 (Wash. 1953); State ex rel.
City of Tacoma v. Rogers, 203 P.2d 325 (Wash. 1949).
20. See infra note 21.

March 1999]

Dissecting the State

1207

havior when bargaining with the federal government. Both federal
and state officials frequently try to deceive each other about their
available resources, need for assistance, willingness to terminate in
tergovernmental grants, and likelihood of future noncompliance
with grant conditions. This willingness to provide misinformation
to the other level of government can obviously make intergovern
mental relations more costly. It is possible that the principle of
state supremacy might increase the states' willingness to engage in
such strategic bargaining, thereby undermining useful intergovern
mental arrangements.

In short, the question of whether the federal government ought
to be permitted to dissect the state creates an apparently stark di
lemma. Either allow such dissection, and undermine the efficacy of
nonfederal institutions for the purposes of state and local govern
ance, or forbid it, and undermine the possibility of cooperative fed
eralism. In Part II, I suggest a way to escape this dilemma. The
purpose of Part I, however, is simply to show that neither precedent
nor policy offers an easy way out.
A.

The Ambiguous Case in Precedent for State Supremacy

At first glance, one might take the principle of state supremacy
to be a truism. After all, there is a widespread assumption among
courts, politicians, and political scientists that the federal govern
ment must take nonfederal governmental institutions as it finds
them, accepting the limits that state law imposes on such institu
tions.21 So, for instance, in rejecting the idea that the City of
Tacoma could use its license issued by the Federal Power Commis
sion to condemn state-owned land in violation of state law, the
Washington Supreme Court stated:
If it be held that the Federal government may endow a state-created
municipality with powers greater than those given it by its creator, the

21. For an early judicial statement of this proposition, see Ashton v. Cameron County
Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513, 531 (1936). Ashton held that the Municipal
Bankruptcy Act of 1934 was unconstitutional because it regulated municipalities' power to

declare bankruptcy, a matter that the Court held must be reserved to the state governments.
The logic of Ashton was, however, somewhat strained: although the Court relied on the
proposition that the state government had the exclusive right to control its own subdivisions,
the federal act in question did not deprive any state of such control, as no municipality could
file under the Act without permission from its state government. Thus, Ashton can be seen
as limiting not merely the power of the federal government but also the power of the states to
consent to any enlargement of federal powers. See generally MARTHA DERTHICK, THE IN
FLUENCE OF FEDERAL GRANTS: PUBLIC ASSISTANCE IN MAssACHUSETTS 16 (1970) (describ
ing tradition that federal government can have access to local governments only by securing
consent of state governments). Dell Wright refers to this view as the "coordinate authority"
model of federalism. See WRIGHT, supra note 12, at 40-43.
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state legislature, a momentous and novel theory of constitutional gov
ernment has been evolved that will eventually relegate a sovereign
state to a position of impotence never contemplated by the framers of
our constitutions, state and Federal.22

More recently, the New Mexico Supreme Court expressed a similar
sentiment when it rejected the possibility that federal law could give
a governor the power to ignore contrary state law.23 The New Mex
ico Governor asserted that the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act (IGRA) gave him authority to form compacts with Indian
tribes concerning gambling on reservations even if state law prohib
ited him from entering into such compacts. The court doubted
whether "Congress, in enacting the IGRA, sought to invest state
governors with powers in excess of those that the governors possess
under state law."24 In any case, the court was also "confident that
the United States Supreme Court would reject any such attempt by
Congress to enlarge state gubernatorial power."25
Why such confidence? An inspection of precedent suggests that
the basis for such assurance is hardly obvious. This is not to say
that the principle is indefensible, but only that courts have not yet
provided a coherent justification. One might try to defend the prin
ciple of state supremacy by invoking the notion that local govern
ments are

"creatures of the state,"

agencies that the state

government is free to destroy or alter as it pleases. This doctrine is
most frequently associated with the Court's decision in Hunter v.

City of Pittsburgh,26 in which the Court upheld Pennsylvania's con
solidation of the town of Allegheny with the City of Pittsburgh, de
claring that the "number, nature and duration of the powers
conferred upon these [municipal] corporations and the territory
over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of
the State. "27 But one can trace such a view back at least to Trustees

of Dartmouth College v. Woodward,28 in which Justice Story distin
guished between private and municipal corporations, stating that
only the former were protected from state law by the Contract
Clause of Article I, Section 10.29 Hunter simply extends Justice
22. City of Tacoma II, supra note 19, 307 P.2d at 567.
State ex rel. Clark v. Johnson, 904 P.2d 11 (N.M. 1995).
24. Johnson, 904 P.2d at 26.
25. Johnson, 904 P.2d at 26.
26. 207 U.S. 161 (1907).
27. Hunter, 207 U.S. at 178.
28. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 {1819).
29. Dartmouth College, 11 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 668, 682-83. For a discussion of the origins
and history of this distinction between private and municipal corporations, see Joan C. Wtl23. See
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Story's argument to hold that, unlike private corporations, local
governments are not protected from state legislation also by the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The

Hunter-Dartmouth College doctrine, however, is a poor

source for the idea that Congress cannot enlarge the power of local
governments without the state legislature's consent.

Hunter states

only that state or local officials' loss of office or power is not a "tak
ing" of property, impairment of contract, or loss of liberty or prop
erty without due process of law within the meaning of Article I,
Section 10 or the Fourteenth Amendment.30 To be sure, such a
doctrine might place a limit on some congressional powers: Con
gress arguably cannot invoke Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend
ment to enlarge the powers of local governments, because local
governments would have no Fourteenth Amendment right for Con
gress to enforce.31 But there is no compelling reason why such a
doctrine would have any effect on Congress's other powers, such as
its power to regulate interstate commerce, that do not depend on a
preexisting constitutional right.32
One might argue that, under

Hunter, the state legislature is con

stitutionally entitled to speak for the subdivisions, departments, and
agencies of the state, because such subparts of the state simply have
no legal identity apart from the state legislature. Under this reason
ing, the state legislature must be able to veto its subdivisions' or
departments' participation in federal regulatory schemes, because
such subparts of the state lack the power to speak for themselves.
But the Court has never accepted such a formalistic equation of a
Iiams, The Invention ofthe Municipal Corporation: A Case Study in Legal Change, 34 AM. U.
L. REv. 369 (1985).
30. See Hunter, 207 U.S. at 178-81.
31. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997). To the extent that the voting
rights of citizens are affected by a state's allocation of power among its municipalities, the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause and the Fifteenth Amendment might
limit state control of its subdivisions. See, e.g., Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist., 458 U.S. 457
(1982); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 341 (1960). Congress might, therefore, have the
power to limit states' control over their municipalities as an appropriate way to enforce the
voting rights of citizens under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. See, e.g., City of
Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975) (requiring city's proposed annexation of
county territory to be precleared by the Department of Justice pursuant to § 5 of the Voting
Rights Act).
32. Several lower courts have suggested that the Hunter doctrine does not limit
Congress's powers to bestow statutory rights on local governments. See Rogers v. Brockette,
588 F.2d 1057, 1064 (5th Cir. 1979); San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco, 457 F. Supp.
283 (S.D. Cal. 1978). Such a doctrine might be rooted in fears that the courts are institution
ally incapable of deciding the difficult questions of institutional design raised by disputes
about local governments' powers and territorial jurisdiction. See Richard Briffault, Who
Rules at Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local Governments, 60 U. Cm. L. REv. 339
(1993).
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state and its subdivisions. To the contrary, the Court has expressly
rejected such a view: according to the Court, counties and munici
palities do not enjoy immunity from lawsuits under the Eleventh
Amendment, because the Eleventh Amendment protects only "one
of the United States" from suits in federal court, and counties and
cities are not agents of the state governments but rather independ
ent corporations that speak for themselves and not the state.33 If
local governments really are independent corporations, as the
Court's Eleventh Amendment "arm-of-the-state" jurisprudence im
plies,34 then the federal government should be able to delegate fed
eral responsibilities to them just as it delegates federal duties to
private nonprofit corporations (for example, Howard University,
the Red Cross, etc.), preempting in the process all state legislation
that might interfere with the federal license of the federal agent.
Rhetoric about municipalities being "creatures of the state" is
especially unhelpful given that the federal government frequently
authorizes private corporations to administer federal law, even
though such private organizations are creatures of state law. So, for
instance, few would doubt that if a private electrical utility coopera
tive obtained a federal license to build a dam on a navigable water
way, then that license would preempt state laws barring the
construction of the dam.35 This would be so, even though the coop
erative is in some sense a "creature of the state," because state laws
ordinarily determine how one goes about forming cooperatives.
Likewise, when the Resolution Trust Corporation (RT C) takes over
failed savings and loans (S&L) as their receiver and is subrogated
into the rights of the S&L, no one doubts that the RT C can effec
tively extend the powers of the private S&L by preempting some
state-law defenses- usury, etc. - that might otherwise be asserted
against the RT C's claim.36 This is so even though the S&L is a crea
ture of the state, and its organization is rooted in state law. Ex
tending this reasoning, federal agencies should be able to convert
willing municipalities into federal agents, despite the fact that the
33.See, e.g., Monell v. New York City Dept. of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S.658 (1978).
34.For an overview of the jurisprudence, see Alex E. Rogers, Note , Clothing State Gov
ernmental Entities in Sovereign Immunity: Disarray in the Eleventh Amendment Arm-of-the·
State Doctrine, 92 Co LUM. L. REv. 1243 (1992).
35.See First Iowa Hydro-Electric Coop. v.Federal Power Commn., 328 U.S. 152 , 164
(1946) ("To require [the co-op) to secure ...a state permit
as a condition precedent to
securing a federal license for the same project under the Federal Power Act would vest in
[the state] a veto power over the federal project.").
36. Of course, C ongress would still have to authorize such preemption, and a presump·
tion against wholesale creation of federal common law might lead courts to reject implicit
preemption of state-law defenses. See O'Melveny & Myers v. FDIC , 512 U.S.79 (1994).
.

.

•

March 1999]

Dissecting the State

1211

municipalities are "creatures of the state." This challenge is espe
cially powerful given that several prominent legal scholars have ar
gued that municipalities ought to enjoy the same powers as private
corporations.37 Even if one agrees with the dominant view that
public corporations ought not to enjoy the same protection enjoyed
by private organizations as a matter of federal constitutional law,38
one might still give Congress the discretion to bestow a sort of fed
eral home rule on municipalities as a matter of federal statutory
law.
A second and apparently more promising basis for the principle
of state supremacy is the doctrine of state autonomy.39 The Court
has recently revived its state autonomy jurisprudence with two deci
sions, New York v. United States4° and Printz v. United States, 41 both
of which struck down federal laws that imposed on nonfederal offi
cials affirmative duties - to take title to low-level radioactive
waste, and to regulate the purchase of :firearms, respectively. In the
somewhat colorful language of New York, "Congress may not sim
ply 'commandee[r] the legislative processes of the States by directly
compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory pro
gram.' "42 One might argue that, when the federal government in
sulates state or local officials from the limits imposed by state law,
the federal government somehow commandeers the state govern
ments' regulatory processes by forcing the state government to
make its officials available to enforce the federal government's reg
ulatory scheme.
But this sort of argument faces an obvious initial difficulty: fed
eral law does not require anyone to do anything when it preempts
state laws that limit the powers of state or local officials. At most,
such federal laws simply require the state to remove certain restric
tions on the power of subordinate officials so that those officials can

voluntarily assume federal duties. Such federal preemption of
state-law limits on state or local governmental institutions differs
37.The most famous exposition of this position remains Gerald E.Frug, The City as a
Legal Concept, 93 HARv. L. REv. 1057 {1980). For a criticism of Frog's argument that cities
are powerless, see Richard Briffault, Our Localism (part II), 90 CoLUM.L. REv. 346 (1990).
38.For some defenses of the distinction between public and private corporations, see
Robert C. Ellickson, Cities and Homeowners Associations, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 1519 {1982).
39.This "state autonomy" jurisprudence was the basis for the New Mexico Supreme
C ourt's assertion that C ongress could not enlarge the power of the governor to negotiate
compacts with Indian tribes. See supra note 8.
40. 505 U. S.144 {1992).
41. 521 U.S.898 {1997).
42.New York, 505 U. S.at 161 (quoting Hodel v.Vrrginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Assn., 452 U. S. 264, 288 {1981)).
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from other types of federal preemption. Maybe Congress cannot
"commandeer" - that is, force - county sheriffs to perform back
ground checks on gun purchasers. But suppose such sheriffs want
to perform such background checks and state law prohibits them
from doing so. Why cannot federal law liberate such officials from
the constraints of state law by authorizing them to do what state law
forbids?
Moreover, state autonomy jurisprudence seems even more inap
plicable if, as New York suggests, such jurisprudence is rooted in the
need to protect political accountability.43 One can perhaps argue
that Congress would deflect the voters' hostility from itself onto
state legislatures by forcing state legislatures to locate sites for low
level radioactive waste. In such a case, Congress forces an unwill
ing political body to take a highly visible and very unpopular action;
voters arguably might misattribute responsibility for such an action
to the state legislature, its immediate and visible cause, rather than
to Congress, its remote but actual cause. But such an argument
based on political accountability seems much harder to make when
Congress simply authorizes a state or local official to undertake
some action in violation of state law. In that case, the state legisla
ture is not required to take any visible action that might invite retri
bution from affected voters; the only visible actor is the state or
local official who chooses to act pursuant to congressional authori
zation and therefore is properly accountable for the costs of the
action.
One might make a stronger argument for the principle of state
supremacy by abandoning the rhetoric of political accountability never a persuasive rhetorical trope in any case - and instead focus
ing on the distributive injustice and inefficiency of "comman
deering"

legislation.

As

I

have

argued

elsewhere, 44

"commandeering" legislation is analogous to a regulatory taking: in
effect, such legislation confiscates state and local governments' re
sources, placing them at the disposal of the federal government.
If one views "commandeering" legislation as analogous to a reg
ulatory taking and abandons the theme of political accountability,
43. See New York, 505 U.S.at 168.

44. See Hills, supra note 2. Such confiscation of public organizations' resources, like con

fiscation of private organizations' property, is distributively unjust and economically ineffi
cient it forces public organizations (and the coalitions of voters that control them) to bear
the costs of federal programs serving needs that state and local governments do not create ,
and it erodes the value of state and local political involvement to voters and politicians ,
reducing their incentive to vote, run for office, or otherwise engage in state or local political
activity.
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then the case for the principle of state supremacy seems much
stronger. The federally empowered state or local official, after all,
necessarily cannot undertake any official federal action - for ex

ample, gas up the squad car, deposit a paycheck, boot up the com
puter, post a letter, turn on a light in her office - without
consuming tax dollars authorized or appropriated for other pur
poses.

So, for instance, if the federal government authorized

county sheriffs to perform background checks on gun purchasers,
then such sheriffs would necessarily expend nonfederal tax revenue
for such federal duties: background checks require activities - tel
ephone calls, staff time, office supplies, computers - that all con
sume either state or county tax revenue.

If the county sheriff

expends such revenue for purposes prohibited by the legislative

body that appropriated the revenue, then the county sheriff effec
tively confiscates such revenue for federal purposes just as surely as
if he or she were a Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Fire
arms agent who occupied state buildings to perform background
checks.

In short, by authorizing state or local officials to implement fed
eral programs in violation of state policies, the federal government
effectively confiscates state resources and uses them for the benefit
of the federal government. To the extent that New York and Printz
forbid Congress from confiscating state tax revenue and regulatory
capacity for federal ends, one might argue that they should also bar
the federal government from authorizing subordinate state or local
officials to engage in such forbidden confiscation.45
Yet even this analogy to regulatory takings does not conclu

sively entail the principle of state supremacy. The difficulty with

such an argument is that, when the federal government authorizes
some subordinate state or local officer to implement a federal pro

gram, it does not merely redistribute power and money to itself; it

also redistributes power among state institutions. One can argue

that such federal arbitration among competing governmental enti
ties is more consistent with the purpose of a federalist system than
purely federal �ggrandizement of power at the expense of the state
as a whole. Take, for instance, federal laws that enable cities to
ignore limits imposed on them by state law: such federal laws vio45. Indeed, the conflict inNew York can be regarded as an intrastate quarrel between the
governor and the state legislature in which the federal government took the side of the gover
nor. The Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act Amendments of 1985 had been endorsed
by Governor C uomo (and the National Governors' Association); it was the New York state
legislature that balked at implementing the federal law by choosing actual waste sites.
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late the principle of state supremacy, but they also might promote
the very policies that federalism is said to advance by empowering
local governments. It is frequently said that federalism broadens
opportunities for political participation.46 But one would think that
federal

empowerment

of

local governments

would

be

well

calculated to promote such an end even better than control of local
governments by state governments. Elected city officeholders, after
all, are elected from smaller constituencies than state officeholders,
and there are many more local elected officials than state elected
officials. Cities rather than states, therefore, might arguably be a
more natural home for small-scale democracy that is "close to the
people."
Put more generally, federal laws that redistribute power among
state and local governmental institutions do not unambiguously
weaken nonfederal institutions and thereby undercut the purpose
of a federal system of government. Such laws, therefore, might be
distinguishable from the laws struck down in New York and Printz,
which simply supplanted nonfederal power with federal power. To
continue the analogy to regulatory takings, one might draw an anal
ogy here between federal laws that allocate powers among
nonfederal institutions and land-use regulations that arbitrate be
tween the claims of competing landowners. As Joseph Sax notes,
when government performs the function of arbitrating between
landowners, the courts are much less likely to find an unconstitu
tional taking than when the government acts as an "entrepreneur"
and simply takes over private land for its own purposes.47 Like
wise, one also might argue that the courts should distinguish be
tween federal laws that arbitrate between competing nonfederal
institutions and federal laws that commandeer such institutions for
federal purposes.

Missouri

v.

Jenkins48 suggests that the Court might accept pre

cisely such a distinction between federal laws that commandeer
nonfederal officers' services and federal laws that preempt state-law
limits on nonfederal officers' authority. The Jenkins Court held
that a district court could enjoin a state constitutional limit on mil
lage so that a school district - nominally a defendant - could
raise property taxes sufficiently to cover the cost of the judicial rem
edy for segregated schools. In distinguishing this remedy from a
46. See, e.g., Gregory v.Ashcroft, 501 U. S. 452, 458 {1991) (stating that the federal struc

ture "increases opportunity for citizen involvement in democratic processes").

47. See Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 67 {1964).
48. 495 U.S.33 (1990).
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direct judicial order to raise taxes (which, according to the Court,
exceeded the district court's equitable discretion), the Court noted
that, by simply preempting state-law limits on the school district's
powers, the district court gave "proper respect for the integrity and
function of local government institutions" that were "ready, willing,
and - but for the operation of state law curtailing their powers able to remedy the deprivation of constitutional rights them
selves."49 In other words, the Court distinguished between a fed
eral command that a state raise taxes - "commandeering" of a
state - and a federal command that a state allow one of its subdivi
sions to raise taxes - dissection of the state - forbidding the for
mer but allowing the latter.
Of course, the state in Jenkins had been found to have deprived
individuals of equal protection through de jure segregation of pub
lic schools.50 Under these circumstances, the federal court would
have been justified in "commandeering" the state's regulatory
processes to create a remedy for the violation if no less intrusive
remedy were available.51 This holding, therefore, is distinguishable
from situations in which Congress attempts to dissect the state
where the state is innocent of any constitutional violation. How
ever,

Jenkins's willingness to distinguish between federal judicial

decrees that compel state taxation and decrees that enjoin state lim
its on local taxes suggests that dissection might be regarded by the
Court as less intrusive than "commandeering." Such a holding cau
tions against an easy inference that, because Congress cannot com
mandeer a state's regulatory processes, therefore, Congress also
cannot liberate a subdivision from the control of the state
government.

In short, the argument rooted in state autonomy precedent is
not groundless, but it is also not overwhelmingly persuasive. Its
force depends on whether the federal government should play a
role in allocating power among state and local political institutions.

If the federal government should play such a role, then the case
against federal empowerment of state or local officials is weak. If
not, then the case is much stronger. It is no good to pretend that
such an issue can be resolved by parsing a handful of state auton
omy (or any other) judicial decisions; the question of the proper
49. See Jenkins, 495 U. S. at 51.
50. See Jenkins, 495 U. S. at 37.
51. See, e.g., Spallone v. United States, 493 U. S. 265, 276 (1990) {holding that contempt
sanctions can be imposed byjudge against city to enforce consent decree remedying constitu
tional and statutory violations).
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role of the federal government in defining local political institutions
is fundamentally a policy question. Therefore, it is to this policy
question this article now turns.
B. The Case for State Supremacy in Terms of Policy:
How Dissection of the State Unnecessarily Undermines
Local Self-Governance
What policy argument can be made in favor of the principle of
state supremacy? As I shall argue below, there are reasons to be
lieve that the federal government's dissection of the state tends to
undermine the efficacy of nonfederal governmental institutions for
the purpose of local self-governance. The natural place to begin
this inquiry is to examine the federal government's track record in
creating institutions for local self-governance. Although the evi
dence is admittedly sketchy and anecdotal, this track record does
not inspire confidence.
The federal government's main efforts in creating local govern
ments have been in conditions attached to grants-in-aid, requiring
cities and states to set up functionally specialized agencies staffed
by professionals who deliver a single service - for example, hous
ing, income maintenance, or education - insulated from control by
elected policy generalists like mayors, legislators or governors.52
How sensible were these institutional choices? It became a cliche
of the late 1960s and early 1970s to denounce such arrangements as
immune from democratic control, inefficient, uncoordinated, cha
otic, and generally unaccountable.53 Commentators have repeat
edly complained that such federally sponsored governments led to
fragmented policymaking because each state or local agency pur
sued its specialty - housing, education, environmental protection
- in isolation from other state or local policies.54 In addition, it
has been a common complaint that such functionally specialized
state and local agencies were often more loyal to the federal agency
from which they received their federal funding than to the local or
52. See Hills, supra note 2, at 860 & n.167.
53. For a summ ary of the literature, see Thomas J. Anton, Intergovernmental Change in
the United States: An Assessment of the Literature, in Puauc SECTOR PERFORMANCE: A
CoNCEPTIJAL TURNING POINT 15 (Trudi C. Miller ed., 1984).
54. Such fragmentation prompted the late Edward Muskie, then chair of the Senate
Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, to hold hearings in 1966 to investigate
whether the bureaucracies created by federal grant programs were inefficient and uncoordi
nated, concluding that indeed they were. See Creative Federalism Hearings: Before the Sub
comm. on Intergovernmental Relations ofthe Senate Comm. on Govt. Operations, 89th Cong.
(1966).
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state governments for whom they ostensibly worked.55 Exploiting
their close relationship with the counterpart federal agency and
their greater familiarity with the federal grant process, such agen
cies would use federal policies to resist oversight by state or local
politicians, arguing - sometimes misleadingly - that the demands
of state or local politicians were inconsistent with federal law and
would result in the forfeiture of federal funds. The ACIR dubbed
such arrangements "creative feudalism" to highlight the manner in
which each functional bureaucracy guarded its fiefdom from polit
ical control.56 A spate of implementation studies decried the feder
ally sponsored structures of cooperative federalism as inefficient,
self-defeating, dysfunctional, and ungovemable.57
A preliminary word of caution is in order at this point: it is
important to separate measured analysis from hyperbole. More re
cent empirical research suggests that many conventional criticisms
of the intergovernmental bureaucracy sponsored by the federal
government are overstated.58 More importantly, the structural inef
ficiencies of creative federalism were not gratuitous. The federal
government imposed various "single agency" and "qualified per
sonnel" requirements on the states because they feared - with
good reason - that state politicians were likely to be disloyal to
certain national goals, such as the provision of public goods to non
residents or the redistribution of wealth. It is a familiar point that
nonfederal politicians have structural incentives to disregard certain
national goals. For instance, state and local officials have an incen
tive to undermine federal policies that redistribute wealth to low
income groups, because such federal policies attract households
55. See, e.g., Mark C.Gordon , Differing Paradigms, Similar Flaws: Constmcting a New
Approach to Federalism in Congress and the Court, 14 YALE L. & PoLY. REv. 187, 211-12
(1996) (discussing the danger that informal relations among state and federal intergovern
mental bureaucracy might suppress opportunities for citizen involvement in politics).
56.See DONALD H.HAIDER, WHEN GOVERNMENTS CoME TO WASHINGTON: GOVER
NORS, MAYORS, AND !NrERGOVERNMENTAL LoBBYING 60 (1974). For other accounts of the
hostility to the complexity and redundancy of the intergovernmental system of categorical
grants in the 1960s and early 1970s , see CoNLAN, supra note 12, at 45-50; GARTH L. MAN
GUM, THEEMERGENCE OF MANPOWER POLICY 70-81 (1969).
57.For examples of such implementation literature, seeEUGENE BARDACH, THE IMPLE
MENTATION GAME: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER A BILL BECOMES LAW (1977); MARTHA
DERTHICK, NEW TOWNS IN-TOWN: WHY A FEDERAL PROGRAM FAILED (1972); JEFFREY L.
PRESSMAN & AARON B. WILDAVSKY, IMPLEMENTATION: Ho w GREATEXPECTATIONS IN
WASHINGTON ARE DASHED IN OAKLAND (2d ed.1979). For colorful examples of how such
federal regulatory requirements might create obvious inefficiencies, see TERRY SANFORD,
STORM OVER THE STATES 90-96 (1967).
58.See PAULE. PETERSON ET AL., WHEN FEDERALISM WoR.KS 216-17 (1986) (noting
that typical attacks on Johnson's C reative Federalism and Nixon's New Federalism fre
quently "substitute flamboyant rhetoric for careful analysis").
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with low capacity to contribute to the tax base of the city and in
crease the need for costly governmental services. In particular,
elected officials will have a greater incentive to divert federal funds
away from the federally mandated redistributive purposes much

more than the nonelected policy professionals employed by state
and local agencies - so-called "policy specialists."59

Likewise,

state and local politicians have an incentive to be profligate with

national funds because their residents do not bear the full tax bur
den of raising federal revenue. 60 I will return to these points in
section l.C, when I discuss the costs of state supremacy.

Nevertheless, whatever their advantages for the pursuit of na
tional goals, there is little doubt that the structures imposed by the
federal government were not well-suited for local self-governance.
That is, these structures did not ensure the cost-effective delivery of
local public goods in a manner politically accountable to local resi

dents.61 In short, the federal goveI'Ilil}.ent seems to have certain ten

dencies toward unnecessary bureaucratic sclerosis.

Such a

conclusion should hardly be a surprise: there are several institu
tional reasons to expect that the federal government will perform

less effectively than state governments in supervising local agencies,
whether they be field offices or municipalities.

First and most important is the problem of governmental over
load: the federal government has an insufficient number of elected
policy generalists to monitor effectively 39,000 local governments.62
59. The classic statement of these state and local incentives to avoid redistribution of
wealth is PAUL E. PETERSON, CITY LIMITS 71-82 (1981). Peterson and Mark Rom provide
empirical evidence suggesting that state governments struggle to avoid becoming "welfare
magnets " in PAU L E. PETERSON & MAruc C. RoM , WELFARE MAGNETS (1990). According
to P eterson and Rom, states cut their AFDC and Medicaid benefits by $30 per recipient fo r
every $ 100 o f benefits paid b y the state i n the preceding year above the level of benefits paid
by the average contiguous state. See id. at 75-83. For more recent findings confirmin g these
results, see Mark Carl Rom et al. , Interstate Competition and Welfare Policy. Pusuu s, Sum
mer 1998, at 17. A decade after Senator Musk ie's hearings denouncing the inefficiency of
federal bureaucratic intrusion into state and local govern ments, William Prox mire held hear
ings to denounce local politicians' habitual diversion of Community Development Block
Grant money from assistance of low-income neighborhoods to economic development. For
an account of such hearings , see MICHAEL J. RICH, FEDERAL POLICYMAKING AND THB
PooR: NATIONAL GOALS, LocAL CHOICES , AND DISTRIBUTIONAL OUTCOMES 341- 42 (1993).
60. For an instance in which control of federal grants by federal agency specialists may
have been necessary to prevent waste of federal money, see Martha Derthick , Professional
Fiefdoms Appraised: The Case of Social Services, Pusuu s, Spring 1976, at 121-34.
61. Even P eterson, Rabe, and Wong note that the intergovernmental system of the 1960s
and 1970s suffered initially from excessively detailed regulations, tight audits, and overly
complex evaluations that were relaxed only in response to complaints by state and local poli
ticians about excessive federal interference with nonfederal political structures. See id. at
140- 47.
62. In 1987, the Bureau of the Census reported 3,042 counties, 19,205 municipalities,
16,691 townships, 14,741 school districts, and 29, 4 87 special districts. See VINCENT OSTROM
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Five hundred thirty-five Members of Congress simply lack the time,
attention span, or incentive to consider the details of how local gov
ernments (or other nonfederal institutions) ought to be designed
and controlled.
To appreciate how daunting this task of supervising local gov
ernments can be, consider a simple hypothetical federal law that
dissects the state. Suppose that Congress were to enact a federal
statute authorizing "home-rule municipalities" to adopt and en
force antidiscrimination ordinances prohibiting discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation. This hypothetical federal law dis
sects the state by expressly preempting any state law or state consti
tutional doctrines that interferes with municipalities' adoption of
such ordinances.
Congress reasonably cannot be expected to consider adequately
the difficult questions of institutional design that such a hypotheti
cal law would present. Whether a home-rule municipality ought to
enact laws regulating employment will depend critically, for in
stance, on how easily home-rule municipalities can be incorporated
or chartered and how easily they can annex land. In states where
such incorporation and annexation is largely controlled by local res
idents, one tends to see dozens - perhaps hundreds - of munici
palities crammed cheek by jowl into a single metropolitan area,
each governing a small population and tiny fragment of territory.63
This promiscuous creation of local governments might be perfectly
sensible if there is some institution with greater geographic jurisdic
tion that has the time and incentives to monitor the local govern
ments' regulations to ensure that the municipalities do not impose
external costs on each other. Under normal circumstances, this in
stitution would be the state legislature. Our hypothetical federal
statute, however, preempts such state legislative control over a cat
egory of local ordinances. Unless Congress has time and incentives
to perform the state legislature's supervisory function, there is a sig
nificant likelihood that the local governments will run amok with
their new federal powers. Some municipalities will use their federal
authority to overregulate (because they can export the costs of their
antidiscrimination laws to neighboring jurisdictions where the em
ployers' main offices are located), while others will underregulate
ET AL., LocAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (1988) (citing 1987 CENSUS
prelim. rep., a t 1).

Govrs .

63. For a recent study of (and attack on) the "fragmentation" of metropolitan areas into
large numbers of competing municipalities, see DAVID RusK, CmES WITiiOUT SUBURBS 34
(1993). For a more favorable assessment of such fragmentation, see generally MARK
SCHNEIDER, THE CoMPETITIVE CITY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SUBURBIA (1989).
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(because the employees who would be protected by such laws are
nonvoting commuters). In short, Congress's delegation of power to
local governments could result in regulatory incoherence, simply
because local governments are not well-designed for the federal du
ties that have been bestowed on them.
Congress can avoid this danger of mismatching federal duties to
local structure only by carefully considering how local governments
are created, enlarged, and supervised in each state whenever it be
stows federal authority on local governments. But it is inconceiv
able that Congress could give sufficient attention to such minutiae
of state-local relations, given that different states have radically dif
ferent laws64 and political cultures65 that affect state-local relations.
Moreover, it is unlikely that individual members of Congress, rep
resenting districts of roughly 600,000 people, will have the same
electoral incentive to consider small-scale intrastate externalities as
do state legislators, who represent an average of 50,000 persons (as
low as 2,900 persons in New Hampshire).66 Fifteen thousand state
elected officials simply have greater capacity to consider the mun
dane arcana of interlocal bickering than do 535 congresspersons
burdened by a plethora of other issues.67
64. For some recent surveys of state-local legal relations in different states, see PoLmcs
.AMERICAN STATES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 60-70 (Virginia Gray & Herbert
Jacob eds., 6th ed. 1996); A DECADE OF DEVOLUTION: PERSPECTIVES ON STATE-LoCAL RE.
LATIONS (E. Blaine Liner ed., 1989).
65. According to Daniel Elazar, different states and regions have different political cul
tures, meaning different attitudes toward government, the marketplace, democratic control,
and bureaucracy. Elazar characterizes these cultures as "traditionalistic," "individualistic,"
or "moralistic." See DANIEL ELAZAR, AMERICAN FEDERALISM: THE VIEW FROM THE
STATES 110-31 (3d ed. 1984). "Moralistic" cultures tend to believe that the government
serves the public welfare; that professionalized bureaucracies ought to deliver public services;
that citizens ought to participate widely in political deliberation; and that such debate should
be based on the issues rather than partisan affiliation. By contrast, "individualistic" cultures
tend to distrust government, regard politics as "dirty," and wish to limit governmental activ
ity to regulation of imperfections in the marketplace. Massachusetts tends toward "moralis
tic" politics, whereas Arizona tends toward an "individualistic" political culture. See id. at
124-25. Subsequent research confirms that different political cultures create different voter
attitudes toward government and different networks of political connections even between
otherwise geographically, ethnically, culturally, and socially similar municipalities. See
Arthur R. Stevens, State Boundaries and Political Cultures: An Exploration in the Tri-State
Area ofMichigan, Indiana and Ohio, PUBuus, Wmter 1974, at 111. For more recent litera
ture exploring Elazar's "subculture" thesis, see generally Symposium, State Political Subcul
tures: Further Research, PUBLros, Spring 1991, at 1.
These political cultures can affect the degree to which a state supervises local governmen
tal activity. See ELAZAR, supra, at 219-20. "Moralistic" political cultures in Massachusetts,
for instance, tend to encourage localism. "Traditionalistic" regimes in the Southeast tend to
discourage such autonomy. See id. at 118.
66. See National Conference of State Legislatures, Constituents per State Legislative Dis
trict (visited Feb. 13, 1999) <http://www.ncsl.org/programsnegman/elect/cnstprst.htm>.
67. Of course, Congress could theoretically create its own regionally elected agents what one might call federal prefects - to supervise the actions of federal field offices. But
IN THE
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Second, the diversity of constituencies within the United States
and their conflicts at the national level prevent national agencies
from taking clear and decisive actions to supervise field offices or
other local structures.68 Political polarization at the national level
prevents any consensus about enforcement from developing in the
national legislature, leaving field offices free to pursue their own
agendas.69 By contrast, state and local politicians govern smaller,
more homogeneous populations and therefore face fewer problems
of polarization in supervising federal field offices within their juris
diction. The evidence suggests that they use their influence aggres
sively to affect field office operations.10
Finally, Congress, unlike state legislatures, is relatively invulner
able to the pressures of intergovernmental competition, pressures
that may give elected representatives an additional incentive to
monitor and reduce inefficient implementation of policy by bureau
crats. According to the hypothesis first posed by Charles Tiebout's
landmark article and subsequently developed by voluminous theo
retical and empirical literature, to the extent that residents can
freely enter and exit governmental jurisdictions, governments have
an incentive to behave like firms in supplying local public goods:
they compete with each other for residents and their tax dollars.71
Congress historically has been reluctant to delegate broad policymaking discretion to elected
officers, in part because members of Congress like to take credit for performing casework for
their constituents and jealously guard this prerogative from rival politicians. Several com
mentators have noted that Congress has been reluctant to bestow unrestricted revenue on
state and local politicians because such revenue sharing would enable state and local politi
cians to take credit for federal policies, eliminating opportunities for ribbon-cutting and other
visible credit-taking by Congress. See, e.g., CoNLAN, supra note 12, at 37-38, 41-43 (noting
reluctance of Congress to yield control of categorical programs because such grants are "the
porkiest of pork" for which Congress can claim credit at election time, and arguing that
"block grants pose a threat to the self-interests of congressmen . . . because they diminish
opportunities for advertising, credit claiming, and casework"); MoRRis P. FIORINA, CoN
GRESS: KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON EsTABLISHMENT 73-74 (2d ed. 1989); HAIDER,
supra note 56, at 66.(describing reluctance of Congress to enact a revenue-sharing plan and
to provide open-ended grants of revenue to its "rivals and adversaries"); DAVID R.
MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 128-29 (1974).
68. See John T. Scholz et al., Street-Level Political
AM. Por.. Sci. REv. 829, 833-34 (1991).

Controls Over Federal Bureaucracy, 85

69. See DERTiilCK, supra note 21, at 196 (noting that political conflict prevents federal
governmentfrom aggressively pursuing policies); RICHARD F. FENNo, JR., CoNGRESSMEN IN
COMMITTEES 77 (1973) (describing partisan conflict on Congressional Education and Labor
Committees). For a popular account of the propensity of the federal government toward
gridlock, see JONATHAN RAuCH, DEMOSCLERos1s: THE SILENT KILLER OF AMERICAN Gov
ERNMENT (1994).
.
70. See Scholz et al., supra note 68, at 842-48; B. Dan Wood, Modeling Federal Imple
mentation as a System: The Clean Air Case, 36 AM. J. PoL. Sci. 40, 56-59 (1992).
71. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Por..EcoN. 416
(1956). For a nicely written summary of recent literature in layperson's terms, see WILLIAM
A. FISCHEL, REGULATORY TAKINGS: LAw,EcoNOMics, AND PoLITics 254-69 (1995). For a

1222

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 97:1201

Empirical literature suggests that such competition constrains the
size of urban bureaucracies.72 Other literature suggests that the ab
sence of intergovernmental competition resulting from centraliza
tion of functions in the federal government increases the size of the
federal bureaucracy implementing the function.73 In short, state
legislators might run a leaner, more efficient operation because in
tergovernmental competition makes them more tax-conscious than
Congress.
All of these considerations suggest that Congress is unlikely to
be the best institution for allocating power among nonfederal gov
ernmental institutions for the purpose of promoting local self
governance. The italicized phrase suggests an important caveat: the
structural characteristics listed above - a high ratio of elected-to
appointed politicians, homogeneous populations, and intergovern
mental competition - are beneficial only if one's goal is the cost
effective delivery of local public goods. If one has other goals in
mind, then these characteristics can be harmful, not beneficial. So,
for instance, if one's goal is redistribution of wealth to low-income
households, interjurisdictional competition for tax base will likely
impede this goal. Likewise, if one's goal is to provide benefits to
persons residing outside a municipality - say, interstate transit then the dominance of the municipality by elected officials who are
highly responsive to local residents will hardly ensure accomplish
ment of one's goal. To the contrary, one would expect the local
officials to divert federal money away from the goal of benefiting
nonresidents. Thus, the very facts that make state and local govern
ments so efficient and politically responsive for the provision of lo
cal public goods - a high ratio of elected officials to constituents,
low monitoring costs, and high levels of intergovernmental compe
tition - also give such governments an incentive to undermine the
accomplishment of federal goals when they are assigned federal remore detailed analysis and empirical confirmation of this neo-Tiebout position, see

MARK
SCHNEIDER ET AL., PUBuc ENTREPRENEURS! AGENTS FOR CHANGE IN AMERICAN GOVERN·
MENT (1995), and SCHNEIDER, supra note 63.

72. See ROBERT M. STEIN, URBAN ALTERNATIVES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE MARKETS IN
THE PROVISION oF LoCAL SERVICES (1990); Mark Schneider, Intermunicipal Competition,
Budget-Maximizing Bureaucrats, and the Level ofSuburban Competition, 33 AM. J. PoL. Sci.
612 (1989). For a debate about whether evidence for such competition exists, see Albert
Breton, The Existence and Stability of Interjurisdictional Competition in COMPETITION
AMoNG STA'IES AND LoCAL GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY AND EouITY IN AMERICAN FED·
ERALISM 37-63 (Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991), and John E. Chubb, How
Relevant Is Competition to Government Policymaking?, in COMPETITION AMONG STATES
AND LoCAL GOVERNMENTS, supra, at 37-63.
73. See, e.g., David Joulfaian & Michael L. Marlow, Centralization and Government Com
petition, 23 APPLIED EcoN. 1603 {1991).
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sponsibilities. But, to the extent that one is interested in creating
institutions for local self-governance, one can plausibly argue that
state governments are better suited for designing institutions to ac
complish this goal than the federal government.
One might respond that this comparative advantage of state
governments provides no policy justification for the principle of
state supremacy.

After all, why should we adopt constitutional

principles that promote state goals of local self-governance at the
expense of rival national goals? But there are three reasons why,
when one is dealing with nonfederal institutions, one should give
paramount weight to the pursuit of local self-governance.
First and most obviously, the primary goal of nonfederal institu
tions is, well, nonfederal. The raison d'etre of these institutions is
local self-governance, not delivery of national programs. To be
sure, they have an important secondary role in delivering various
nationally funded goods ranging from unemployment insurance to
assistance for needy families. But these are still their secondary
purposes: the bulk of nonfederal institutions' revenue - seventy to
eighty percent, depending on the state - is not derived from fed
eral grants, and the bulk of their duties have nothing to do with
delivery of nationally mandated services.74 It would be odd to give
Congress the power to liberate nonfederal institutions from the
control of state legislatures when state legislatures are better suited
for defining those institutions' primary purpose.
Second, one can safely assume that nonfederal institutions' suit
ability for local self-governance remains important even when they
are carrying out federal law. After all, if the purpose of a national
program did not require local self-governance (that is, the delivery
of local public goods to the local population), then there would be
no reason to use nonfederal institutions to implement the program:
instead, Congress would be well-advised to create a purely federal
agency to implement the national program.

Congress does not

delegate to state or local governments the responsibility to create or
supervise the Foreign Service or the Marines because diplomacy
and national defense are pure national services, the benefits of
which are intended to be spread evenly throughout the nation. By
contrast, when the national government declines to create a purely
national bureaucracy, it is a safe bet that there is some aspect of the
74. Federal grants constituted 26.5% of state-local outlays in 1978. Between 1978 and
1987, federal grants declined precipitously to only 18.2% of state-local outlays. See TIMOTHY
CONLAN, FROM NEW FEDERALISM TO DEVOLUTION: TwENTY-FIVE YEARS OF lNraRGOV
ERNMENTAL REFORM 148 (1998).
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national program requiring institutions that are good at local self
governance. Therefore, even if one regards national policymaking
as paramount, one might want to adopt constitutional doctrines
under which the peculiar advantages of nonfederal institutions for
local self-governance would be preserved.
Third and most important, it is plausible to believe that any fed
eral interest in altering nonfederal institutions' structure to serve
national goals can be accommodated through Congress's power to
induce state cooperation with federal grants-in-aid: Congress ar
guably needs no further power to dissect the state. In section I.C, I
will offer an important qualification to this assertion. For now,
however, consider why voluntary intergovernmental bargains might
be the best way to balance the relative weight of national goals
against local self-governance. Congress can induce state govern
ments to waive what I call "state supremacy" and alter their struc
ture by offering federal revenue to state governments.75 One might
argue that the states' willingness to accept or reject such federal
revenue provides an accurate measure of whether nonfederal insti
tutions should be used for local self-governance or other rival na
tional goals. The revenue proffered by the federal government,
after all, might be regarded as a reasonably reliable measure of how
much the federal government really values the assistance of
nonfederal governments. If state governments decline to alter the
structure of their government and thereby forgo these federal
grants, this is a good sign that the state people (represented by the
state legislature) value local self-governance more than the national
people (represented by Congress) value pursuit of national goals.76
Federal unwillingness to pay the states' asking price suggests that
the national government really did not value nonfederal assistance
enough to justify intrusion into state structure.77 One might infer
that, whenever the federal government cannot get states to cooper
ate With bribes of federal revenue, then the federal government
should not use nonfederal structures at all: instead, the federal gov75. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Commn., 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947)
(requiring Oklahoma to forgo federal grant revenue if it refused to comply with federal de
mands that state officials be governed by merit system).
76. See Hills, supra note 2, at 871-93. Contrary to the popular myth that state officials
cannot say "no" to federal money, there is considerable evidence that nonfederal officials
carefully compare the costs and benefits of federal grants, declining grants where the costs of
the conditions outweigh the value of the money. See WRIGHT, supra note 12, at 91; Hills,
supra note 2, at 858-65; Helen Ingram, Policy Implementation Through Bargaining: The Case
of Federal Grants-in-Aid, 25 PUB. PoL. 499 (1977).
77. See Hills, supra note 2, at 872-75.
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ernment should provide the service in-house with purely federal bu
reaucrats and avoid erosion of local self-govemance.78
In short, the principle of state supremacy ensures that deci
sionmakers most capable of designing and monitoring nonfederal
governmental institutions retain control of such institutions unless
the federal government compensates those decisionmakers for such
loss of control. This is a logical rule, and, although judicial prece
dent provides no sensible explanation for it, both Congress and the
Court have consistently respected it.79
C.

The Case Against State Supremacy: State Centralization and
Strategic Behavior in (not so) Cooperative Federalism

There is an undefended assumption in the defense of state
supremacy provided in section I.B above. I assume that if the fed
eral government wants state governments to alter their structure,
then the federal government can simply bribe the states to do so,
without any fear that transaction costs will impede the proposed
intergovernmental bargains.80 But this assumption of no transac
tion costs is false, and the falseness of this assumption suggests how
the principle of state supremacy might be a potentially dangerous
threat to cooperative federalism.
78. One might compare this federal decision to forgo cooperative federalism in the face
of recalcitrant states to the decision of a firm to use vertically integrated divisions rather than
incur the additional costs of monitoring independent contractors that are likely to be faithless
agents. For an analysis of how the costs of multiple contracts and agency costs might drive a
firm to produce goods and services "in-house" rather than through contract with other firms,
see OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKE.TS AND HIERARCHIES: .ANALYSIS AND ANrrrausr IM
(1975).
79. One might respond to these arguments by arguing that state creation of local govern

PLICATIONS

ments need not entail state supremacy over those governments after they are created. Even
if one assumes that state governments initially ought to create local governments, one might
argue that the federal government could still use such state-created localities to carry out
federal programs, preempting any state laws that interfered with such federal duties. This
response, however, assumes that the federal government can somehow preserve the structure
of local governments while delegating duties to them that are inconsistent with state law. But
a moment's consideration suggests that this is an implausible position: the jurisdictional lim
its on local governments are a crucial part of their structure, and federal delegation of powers
to local governments would necessarily interfere with the structure of local government. For
instance, a school district would be structurally a different entity altogether if its jurisdiction
were enlarged to cover, say, land-use regulation: limiting school districts to educational mat
ters was a deliberate structural decision designed to limit the role of partisan politics in
school matters.

80. "Transaction costs" loosely refers to the cost of striking bargains to transfer an enti
tlement. In the context of this article, the relevant transactions are the intergovernmental
agreements whereby states and local governments agree to implement federal policy in re
turn for federal revenue. I include in the term "transaction costs" the costs of strategic mis
representation of beliefs, preferences, willingness to abide by an agreement, etc. See Avery
Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game Theory and the Law of Contract
Formation, 89 MICH. L. REv. 215, 225 (1990).

1226

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 97:1201

Intergovernmental bargaining is like any other bargaining: it is
costly.

In

particular,

as

explained

below,

both

federal

and

nonfederal officials frequently try to deceive each other about their
available resources, need for assistance, willingness to terminate in
tergovernmental programs, and likelihood of future noncompli
ance. One can conveniently divide such strategic deception into
two categories.81
First, there is the deception that can occur during the lobbying
process by which Congress first creates grant programs. So, for in
stance, intergovernmental lobbying organizations may exaggerate
the costs to nonfederal governments of complying with conditions
on federal funds in an effort to obtain fewer conditions or more
revenue. In this respect, state and local officials engaging in "tin
cup federalism" behave exactly like budget-maximizing federal
agencies that submit oversize budget requests to the Office of Man
agement and Budget or to Congress: in either case, the descriptions
of the cost of implementing federal programs might be colored by
the implementers' desire to receive as large an appropriation as
possible.82 Unfortunately, Congress might lack an independent
source of information with which to correct distorted budget re
quests by either federal agencies or state and local governments.83
Second, deception can occur in the process of enforcing the
grant program after specific states have accepted federal funds. It is
a familiar point that state and local officials frequently act as faith
less agents of the federal government, violating conditions attached
to federal funds whenever the federal government fails to monitor
their compliance.84 Moreover, the federal government cannot per
fectly monitor its nonfederal agents, because monitoring is expen
sive.

The federal government cannot easily measure outputs

produced by federal programs, because such outputs (healthy or
well-educated children, safer streets, accurate yet timely adjudica81. By "strategic deception," I mean the withholding of information by a bargaining
party in order to increase his or her share of the gains from trade at the expense of the other
parties to a bargain. See A. MITCHELL PoLINs KY AN lNTRoDucnoN To LAW AND EcoNoM
ICS 18 (1983).
,

82. For the standard description and analysis of such bureaucratic behavior, see WILLIAM
A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT (1971).

83. Cf. Robert D. Putnam, The Political Attitude of Senior Civil Servants in Western
Europe: A Preliminary Report, 3 BRIT. J. PoL. SCI. 257, 257-60 (1973).
84. See, e.g., Edward A. Tomlinson & Jerry L. Mashaw, The Enforcement of Federal Stan·
dards in Grant-In-Aid Programs: Suggestions for Beneficiary Involvement, 58 VA. L. REv.
600 (1972) (describing instances of state failure to abide by federal rules in administering
AFDC program).
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tion of benefits claims) are difficult to measure.ss But close federal
supervision of inputs can destroy the flexibility in program imple
mentation that presumably was the reason for using nonfederal
governments in the first place.86 Even if the federal government
could carefully monitor the actions of nonfederal agencies to detect
when the agencies are violating congressional intent, it is difficult
for Congress to correct those violations through ex post amend
ments of the original legislation: the original coalition of interests
that enacted some intergovernmental arrangement might not be
able to muster the votes to change the new status quo established
by the nonfederal governments' actions.s7
The absence of effective remedies for breach of intergovern
mental agreements can lead the federal and nonfederal govern
ments to engage in a wasteful game of bluffing.ss The federal
government's ultimate sanction is to withdraw the grant and termi
nate a nonfederal government's involvement in the program. If,
however, the federal agency's personnel were hired on the assump
tion that the street-level implementation of the program would be
provided by a nonfederal agency, then the federal government
might have extremely limited capacity to replace the services pro
vided by nonfederal governments with federally provided serv
ices. s9 Therefore, the sanction of withdrawing federal funds from
noncomplying state or local officials is usually too drastic for the
federal government to use with any frequency: withdrawal of funds
85. See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES Do AND
WHY THEY Do IT 165-68, 175, 247-51 (1989) (explaining constraints on congressional control
of "craft agencies" and "procedural agencies" where agency outputs are difficult to measure
or agency activities are highly technical and therefore invisible to outsiders).
86. So, for instance, the federal government might insist that school districts avoid the
commingling of federal funds for special education with ordinary state and local education
funds in order to prevent the former from being converted to purposes other than aid to the
handicapped. Unfortunately, rigorous separation of such funds can undermine the purpose
of educating disabled children, by placing them in classes that are physically separate from
other students.

87. Cf. Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Admin
istrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REv. 431, 435-40
(1989) (explaining how, "[b]y establishing a new status quo, a noncomplying agency has bro
ken apart the coalition that gave rise to its initial mandate" and has prevented ex post sanc
tions of agency misbehavior even if the legislature can perfectly monitor agency
noncompliance).

88. See BARDACH, supra note 57, at 224 (stating that intergovernmental negotiations
about the shape of cooperative programs can be impeded by parties' awareness that "they
will find it difficult if not impossible to enforce the terms of any agreement they reach once
resources are committed and the program is under way").
89. See Michael J. Scicchitano & David M. Hedge, From Coercion to Partnership in Fed
eral Partial Pre-emption: SMCRA, RCRA, and OSH Act, PtraLrus, Fall 1993 at 107, 114
(noting that "revoking state primacy" in the enforcement of federal regulations "is an empty
threat" because "federal agencies lack the personnel" to carry out the law directly).
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will injure the very clients that the federal government wishes to
serve.90
Lacking a real capacity to terminate funding to punish noncom
plying states, the federal agency might instead feign such a capacity,
threatening to terminate funds unless noncompliance is remedied,
in hopes that the nonfederal policymakers are ignorant of the fed
eral agency's real inability to do so.91 Since state and local legisla
tors are frequently ill-informed about the workings of federal
agencies, they might be deceived by the federal agency's threats and
comply with the federal agency's demands out of a mistaken fear
that the agency will actually terminate federal funding.92 On the
other hand, the nonfederal policymakers might simply match one
deception with another: they might feign willingness to turn down
the federal money and thereby dissuade the federal agency from
enforcing the condition.93 In short, intergovernmental programs
may be afflicted with pervasive and costly gamesmanship - strate
gic deception that leads to delay and waste both when the programs
are initially designed and enacted by Congress and when they are
implemented by the states.
Nevertheless, the system of intergovernmental relations shows
remarkable persistence and effectiveness despite these obstacles.
As I have argued elsewhere, one reason for such success is that the
existence of intergovernmental competition among nonfederal in
stitutions substantially reduces the dangers of strategic behavior.94
90. William Janklow, governor of South Dakota between 1979 and 1987, notoriously ex
ploited the federal government's inability to enforce its AFDC regulations against noncom
plying states. As he candidly observed, "[i]t took me about four years to figure out that I
could really ignore a lot of the federal rules and wouldn't have to face the sanctions
Frankly, I just started ignoring all the federal rules and it made a remarkable difference in
our ability to do things." MARsHALL KAPLAN & SUE O'BRIEN, THE GOVERNORS AND THE
NEW FEDERALISM 47 (1991).
.

•

.

•

91. See DERTiilCK, supra note 21, at 115-18.

92. See DERTiilCK, supra note 21, at 210-11 (describing Massachusetts legislature's inabil
ity to gauge whether the Social Security Administration would actually carry out its threat to
withdraw federal funds in case of state noncompliance).
93. In administering the Federal Emergency Relief Act, Harry Hopkins was repeatedly
confronted by governors who refused to provide state matching funds after receiving federal
grants requiring a state match, knowing that Hopkins would be reluctant to cut off aid to the
unemployed. See JAMES T. PATIERSON, THE NEw DEAL AND THE STATES: FEDERALISM IN
TRANsmoN 136-37 (describing Eugene Talmadge's refusal to appropriate state matching
funds and daring federal officials to cut off federal money); CHARLES H. TROUT, BoSToN,
THE GREAT DEPRESSION, AND THE NEW DEAL 158-62, 309-10 (1977) (describing Boston
Democratic machine's tendency to ignore Hopkins's threats to cut off federal relief money if
federal conditions were not obeyed). As Hopkins complained, in such federal-state conflicts,
"who gets licked? The unemployed. They always get licked." PATIERSON, supra, at 72.
94. See Hills, supra note 2, at 875-86. Eugene Bardach makes a similar point in
BARDACH, supra note 57, at 98-100.
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Under ordinary circumstances, various nonfederal governments
with overlapping territorial jurisdiction - municipalities, counties,
state agencies, etc. - compete with each other for control of fed
eral grants-in-aid. If any nonfederal institution exaggerates the
costs of implementing federal law, then other competing nonfederal
institutions stand ready to provide a rival cost estimate and sup
plant the strategic institution as the recipient of federal funds.95
Moreover, nonfederal governments also monitor rival nonfederal
governments' compliance with federal grant conditions after
nonfederal governments receive federal grants, reporting noncom
pliance to Congress in hopes that such noncompliance will persuade
Congress to reallocate implementing authority and federal revenue
to the monitoring nonfederal institution.96 In short, the dissection
of "the state" into competing institutions with overlapping territo
rial jurisdictions might play an important role in allowing the inter
governmental system to function free from strategic behavior.
But these considerations also suggest why the principle of state
supremacy might be a threat to intergovernmental bargains: in the
ory, the principle of state supremacy gives the state government a
monopoly over all nonfederal governmental institutions.97 If the
federal government cannot dissect the state by granting powers to
any state subdivision or agency that are denied by state law, then
there is a danger that the state legislature will simply swallow the
competition. This worry about the state government's monopoliza
tion of nonfederal institutions is not merely academic. State gov
ernments become increasingly centralized as they assume greater
responsibility for service delivery and financing of local govern
ments' operations.98 Why this trend toward state centralization?
One theory maintains that, like their federal counterparts, state pol
iticians have little interest in increasing the wealth or power of rival
politicians. Rather, they have an incentive to maximize their own
opportunities for patronage and constituent service by depriving lo95. So, for instance, Donald Haider reports that the National Governors' Association
sponsored studies showing that state governments were just as capable of administering the
Safe Streets program as municipalities. See HAIDER, supra note 56, at 248.
96. For instance, the National Conference of Mayors eventually persuaded Congress to
end governors' control of funds from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration by
insisting that governors' use of such funds be carefully monitored. See HAIDER, supra note
56, at 206-07.
97. Of course, state governments might still compete with each other for federal revenue;
however, because state governments do not have overlapping territorial jurisdiction, each
state would have a monopoly over nonfederal governmental resources within its territory.
98. See G. Ross Stephens, State Centralization and the Erosion of Local Autonomy, 36 J.
Centralization in the American States, 13

Por.. 44 (1974); Jeffrey M. Stonecash, Paths ofFiscal
POLY. STUD. J. 653 (1985).
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cal politicians of discretionary control over policymaking and local
budgets.99
But, whatever its cause, state centralization makes federal use of
nonfederal institutions more difficult. As Deil Wright has ob
served, this trend "increas[es the] difficulty of any national govern
ment efforts to target or channel funds to local governments for
purposes that are independent of, or contrary to, state policies. "loo
So, for instance, if the state legislature barred any municipality from
applying directly for federal aid, such a measure would have a sig
nificant effect on the federal government's ability to use cities as
competitors against the states. Congress might still enact "pass
through " grants to state legislatures, but the state legislatures might
impose significant conditions on such funds, limiting Congress's
ability to harness the policymaking capacity of localities.101 Like
wise, if state legislatures reduced state aid to municipalities by pre
cisely the amount of the federal grants that such cities received, the
state legislature might also effectively bar Congress from using mu
nicipalities as contractors for federal purposes. In effect, the state's
vertical integration would eliminate Congress's access to whole cat
egories of nonfederal institutions.
II.

THE PRESUMPTION OF INSTITUTIONAL AUTONOMY:
PROMOTING INTER- AND !NTRAGOVERNMENTAL
COMPETITION THROUGH LIMITS ON STATE
GOVERNMENTS' POWER OVER
FEDERAL GRANT REVENUE

The arguments in Part I leave the constitutional lawyer facing a
dilemma. If one insists on the principle of state supremacy, then
one may promote local self-governance, but only at the expense of
99. See PAUL E. PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM 73-75 (1995). The history of
state-local relations during the nineteenth century reflects some of these incentives. State
legislatures were notorious during the nineteenth century for using "ripper" legislation to
strip local governments of control over local administrative posts in order to maximize their
ability to distribute jobs to political supporters. The wave of state constitutional amendments
prohibiting "special legislation" or protecting "home rule" were ratified in response to this
tendency. See David 0. Porter, The Ripper Clause in State Constitutional Law: An Early
Urban Experiment - Part I, 1969 UTAH L. REv. 287, 299-306. More recently, state govern
ments have exhibited a tendency to impose mandates on local governments that seem to
confirm Peterson's analysis of state political incentives. See ADVISORY CoMMN. ON INTER·
GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, REPORT M-173, MANDATES: CASES IN STATE LoCAL RELA·
TIONS 14 (1990); CoNLAN, supra note 74, 259-60.
100. WRIGHT, supra note 12, at 319.
101. The evidence from state administration of the Small Cities Block grant program sug
gests that state governments would "re-categorize" federal monies to be passed through to
localities by attaching elaborate state-law conditions to such funds. See RICH, supra note 59,
at 119. '
-
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cooperative federalism.

On the other hand, if · one simply gives

Congress unlimited power to dissect the state, then one might en
danger the usefulness of nonfederal institutions for local self
governance. In short, precedent and policy do not provide certain
guidance about
governments.

the

proper

role

of

the

state

and

federal

There are two conventional solutions to this dilemma. First, one
might simply assume that members of Congress will have adequate
electoral incentives to promote effective local self-governance in or
der to win the approval of their constituents. Relying on this as
sumption, one might give Congress an unlimited power to liberate
state and local officers from the constraints of state law, confident
that Congress will exercise prudent discretion in their use of this
power. Second, if one has less confidence in the national political
process, then one might want to use some sort of a "plain state
ment" rule to ensure that Congress adequately deliberated about
the structure of state and local government. Under this approach,
one might allow Congress to reallocate power among state or local
officials, but only if Congress did so with a statute plainly and un
equivocally calling for such a reallocation of power.
Neither of these solutions, however, is entirely satisfactory.
"Political process" theories of federalism seem to rest on heroic as
sumptions about voters' level of information concerning govern
ment structure.102 "Plain statement" rules might encourage more
deliberation in Congress about the structure of state and local gov
ernment. But such a device for encouraging deliberation seems cu
riously unrelated to the institutional capacity of Congress. As
noted in section LB, Congress simply lacks the time and incentives
to deliberate carefully about local self-governance, which is, after
all, the main purpose of nonfederal institutions. Why, then, try to
force Congress to deliberate about the technical arcana - for ex
ample, annexation, incorporation, local governments' subject-mat
ter jurisdiction, and so forth - that Congress is patently unsuited to
consider?
102. Of course, voters may well feel irked by the inefficient delivery of governmental
services. But it is hardly self-evident that voters will blame Congress for such inefficiencies.
It is at least as likely that voters will simply blame the bureaucrats themselves for inefficien
cies in service delivery, without asking how the overall structure of the agency set up by
Congress contributes to the agency's shortcomings. Indeed, it has even been suggested that
individual members of Congress can profit electorally from the ineptitude of governmental
agencies: when bureaucrats bungle in service delivery, then incumbent congresspersons can
win their constituents' gratitude by performing casework for constituents who are aggrieved
by bureaucratic decisionmaking. See BRUCE CAIN ET AL., THE PERSONAL VoTE: CoNSTITU
ENCY SERVICE AND ELECTORAL INDEPENDENCE 205-06 (1987).
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In this Part of the article, I propose a third method for recon
ciling the values of local self-governance and cooperative federal
ism. I argue that the courts might solve this dilemma with a canon
of construction that I call a "presumption of institutional auton
omy." This presumption is simply a canon requiring courts to con
strue ambiguous federal grant legislation

and

state laws to

maximize the ability of nonfederal institutions to compete with
each other for federal money. Under this presumption, state and
local officers would be presumed to be authorized by state law to
use federal grant dollars for a federally specified purpose unless the
state legislature clearly and unequivocally has barred them from
undertaking such federal responsibilities.
The presumption of institutional autonomy is exactly the oppo
site of the "plain statement" rule used to promote federalism in,
say, Gregory v. Ashcroft. Rather than construe ambiguities in fed
eral statutes to favor the interests or autonomy of the states, the
presumption of institutional autonomy construes ambiguities in
state law to help the federal government dissect the state. Put an
other way, the federalism-promoting canon of construction in Greg

ory helps protect federalism through the national political process
in Congress. By contrast, the presumption of institutional auton
omy defended here helps protect nationalism through the political
processes of the states. As I shall explain below, the presumption
allows the federal government to exploit competition between
nonfederal institutions to reduce the risk that any nonfederal insti
tution will be a faithless agent. By requiring a "plain statement"
from the state legislatures before barring a nonfederal officer from
bargaining with the federal government, the presumption helps en
sure that state legislatures will not withhold access to nonfederal
institutions for improper - that is, strategic - reasons.
But, while Gregory's federalism-promoting canon of construc
tion and the presumption of institutional autonomy are mirror
images of each other, they both use the same approach to vindicat
ing constitutional values. In both cases, courts might worry that
they lack the capacity to resolve difficult empirical questions con
cerning the utility of federalism or cooperative federalism. The the
ory underlying both the Gregory canon and the presumption of
institutional autonomy is that, by requiring well-informed political
branches to act by a clear statement, the courts can strike the right
balance between competing structural values.

But, apart from

these considerations of policy, I shall also argue that the presump
tion of institutional autonomy makes sense as a matter of conven-
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tional legal reasoning (though here the case for the presumption is
admittedly more ambiguous). In particular, the presumption helps

promote understanding of some otherwise mystifying judicial
opinions.
A.

Construing Federal Grant Conditions and Remedies to
Promote Intergovernmental Competition

Consider two sorts of ambiguities that might afflict a federal
grant to a local government. First, the federal statute might be am
biguous about whether the local recipient of the grant must have
control over the money free from state oversight. This ambiguity
raises a question of federal law - how to determine the substantive
conditions attached to federal money. Second, assuming that the
federal grant is interpreted to exclude state control of the federal
local grant law, there might be ambiguities about the proper reme
dies to use if the state government nevertheless attempts to dictate
the use of the federal money. On one hand, the court might simply
enjoin state laws that attempt to control the grant to the local gov
ernment, allowing the local government to exercise exclusive con
trol over the money. On the other hand, the court might simply
declare the local government ineligible to apply for the federal

money, implicitly finding that the state in which the local govern
ment is located does not consent to the conditions in the federal

grant. As I shall explain in more detail below, this question con
cerning remedies is largely a question of state law: to resolve this
issue, the court must decide whether a state government would
rather waive its laws controlling the federal grant or instead cease
to be eligible for federal money.
I will argue in this section that, in a broad range of circum
stances specified below, courts should resolve both sorts of ambigu
ities in favor of local control over federal money: using what I call a
"presumption of institutional autonomy," courts should construe

the federal-local grant to exclude state control of the federal
money. The proper remedy for state laws that violate local control

ought to be injunction of the state laws rather than local ineligibility
for the grant. Before I attempt to justify this view, I will define this
position more carefully in section II.A.l, using the Supreme Court's
decision in Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School District103
as an illustration. Then, in section II.A.2, I will provide a justifica103. 469 U.S. 256 {1985).
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tion for the rule rooted in policy, precedent, and the structure of
intergovernmental relations.
1.

Defining the Presumption of Institutional Autonomy in the
Context of Federal-Local Grant Programs

In Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School District, Law

rence County had received over $100,000 from the federal govern
ment to provide compensation for the county's loss of tax revenue
resulting from the existence of tax-exempt federal lands within the
county's boundaries. The federal statute creating the grant pro

gram stated that local governments would have discretion to spend
such funds on "any governmental purpose." A South Dakota stat
ute, however, required the county auditor to distribute both federal
and state payments in lieu of taxes in the same ratio as the county's
general tax revenues were allocated. Because the county distrib
uted sixty percent of its general tax revenue to its school districts,
this state statute effectively required sixty percent of the payment in
lieu of taxes to be allocated to the school districts. The county ar
gued that this state requirement violated the terms of the grant pro
gram, because the federal government intended to provide the
county with unfettered discretion to spend the federal grant on any
purpose, free from state interference.104
The Supreme Court agreed with the county, relying on the PI
LOT statute's language allowing the county to spend the PILOT
funds on "any government purpose."105 But this language resolves
very little: it might simply mean that Congress wished to preclude

federal limits on county activities, not that Congress intended to lib
erate counties from state supervision. So the Court also relied on
the legislative history of the PILOT statute. According to the
Court, Congress had explicitly decided that PILOT funds should
not "pass through" the state governments for the state governments
to distribute to local governments. Instead, in light of the experi
ence with state-county rivalries in the general revenue sharing pro
gram, Congress had deliberately chosen to disburse the PILOT
money directly to local governments without state intermediation.
For the Court, this decision to bypass state governments entailed
the conclusion that a state government also could not enact general
legislation governing PILOT funds even after the county received
such funds.106
104. See Lawrence County, 469 U.S. at 258-59.
105. See Lawrence County, 469 U.S. at 260.
106. See Lawrence County, 469 U.S. at 261-68.
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It is important to see that Lawrence County involves two legal
ambiguities, only one of which the Court addresses. First, there is
the federal statutory ambiguity - the issue of whether the federal
PILOT statute bars the state legislature from interfering with
Lawrence County's discretion to allocate the PILOT grant. Second,
there is a further ambiguity that the Court ignores - the ambiguity
in the remedy that ought to be granted for South Dakota's violation
of the conditions of the grant program.
Even though the Court addresses the first issue, its resolution of
the issue of statutory construction is unsatisfying. As Justice
Rehnquist Goined by Justice Stevens) noted in dissent, "the system
of laws that regulates [county] activities" presupposes that counties
can be altered or destroyed entirely by their parent state govem
ment.107 While this rule might not constrain Congress's powers, it
seems odd t o construe the PILO T

grant as " somehow

emancipat[ing] the county from the state regimen as to what is and
is not a proper governmental purpose for a county. " 108 Admittedly,
the legislative history cited by the Court indicates that the cash was
to be granted directly to the county and not to the state, and that
Congress wished for the county to have the same discretion to
spend the money as it would have to spend any other funds at its
disposal, free from federal strings. It hardly follows, however, that
Congress intended to displace the state legislatures' traditional pre
rogative to define the powers and responsibilities of its counties.
Indeed, if one took the majority's logic seriously, then Lawrence
County should be permitted to use its federal PILOT grant to de
fine and punish felonies, annex territory from neighboring local
governments, create a militia, or modify the state's commercial
code. True, state laws generally prohibit counties and other local
governments from pursuing these ends.109 But, if it is true that the
state cannot place limits on how the county should spend its federal
PILOT funds, then it logically follows that no state-law limits on the
powers of counties can be invoked to limit the county's discretion
to spend its PILOT funds as it pleases. The problem with the
Court's reasoning, in short, is that it ignores how the very definition
107. See Lawrence County, 469 U.S. at 256, 270-71.
108. Lawrence County, 469 U.S. at 272.
109. Unlike municipalities and like cities, counties cannot annex land from neighboring
local governments. See Briffault, supra note 37, at 361. Moreover, local governments gener
ally do not obtain the power to define and provide for the punishment of felonies as a result
of "home rule" powers. e.g., CoMM. ON HoME RuLE OF THE AMERICAN MUNICIPAL AssN.,
MODEL CoNSTL. PROVISIONS FOR MUNICIPAL HOME RULE § 6 (1953); NATIONAL MUNICI
PAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CoNST. § 8.02 (rev. ed. 1968).
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of a "county" presupposes a network of state laws that define and
limit the purposes that counties can pursue. Of course, it is unlikely
that the Court intended to invalidate all state-law limits on county
power. But nothing in the reasoning of the Court explains why
South Dakota's law allocating the county's federal PILOT funds
differs from South Dakota's laws barrin g counties from annexing
other counties, condemning the state house, or enacting a general
criminal code.
While the Lawrence County Court's resolution of the federal
statutory question is unsatisfactory, the Court's attention to the re
medial issue is nonexistent. The majority notes that, pursuant to its
power to spend federal revenue, "Congress may impose conditions
on the receipt of federal funds"110; it concludes from this proposi
tion that any state law interfering with such conditions "runs afoul
of the Supremacy Clause."111 But it is well-settled that Congress
has the power to change a state government's structure by spending
federal revenue only if the state government actually accepts the
revenue and thereby "knowingly and voluntarily accepts the terms
of the contract."112 By setting aside South Dakota's law because it
was inconsistent with the conditions on the federal PILOT grant,
the Court must therefore be assuming that South Dakota has some
how knowingly and voluntarily waived (some of?) its state laws de
fining county powers in order for its counties to continue to be
eligible for federal PILOT grants. This implicit conclusion, how
ever, is odd, given that South Dakota never repealed the law being
challenged in the case and never applied for the federal grant,
which was awarded directly to Lawrence County without the state
government's intermediation. The Court never explains why the
proper remedy in this case is not simply to find that, because South
Dakota's laws do not comply with the conditions attached to the
federal PILOT grant, Lawrence County is ineligible to participate
in the PILOT program and must return its federal PILOT grant.
My criticism of Lawrence County is not intended to suggest that
the holding of the decision is incorrect: as I shall explain below,
110. Lawrence County, 469 U.S. at 269-70.
111. Lawrence County, 469 U.S. at 270.
112. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) ("The legiti
macy of Congress' power to legislate under the spending power thus rests on whether the
State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the 'contract.' There can, of course, be
no knowing acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions or is unable to ascertain what is
expected of it.'') (citations omitted); see also Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Commn., 330 U.S. 127,
143-44 (1947); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589-90 (1937); Massachusetts v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 482-83 (1923).
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there is a powerful case to be made that the case is rightly decided.
The inadequacy of the Court's reasoning, however, requires one to
look deeper for an explanation of the case. One explanation is that
this case is an instance of extreme judicial nationalism that abro
gates the principle of state supremacy. Under this reading, Law

rence County might provide Congress with a right to use willing
local governments as its agents even when state laws prohibit such a
relationship and bar the local governments from accepting federal
money.113 Such a reading would effectively eliminate the principle
of state supremacy by enabling the federal government to "liber
ate" nonfederal institutions from state law simply by bestowing un
restricted federal funds upon them. As Professor Engdahl correctly
notes, any such holding would be inconsistent with the reasoning of
the entire Spending Clause jurisprudence, which has always as
sumed that a state government must voluntarily accept a federal
grant in order for the grant to create any state obligations.114
Another explanation is that the county's voluntary acceptance
of the grant constitutes acceptance by the state for the purposes of
Pennhurst115 and other spending power decisions. But this reason
ing would effectively allow one part of the state to bind the whole.
In effect, such a reading of Lawrence County makes the concept of
"consent" meaningless by allowing Congress to redefine which offi
cial is entitled to "consent" to federal demands on behalf of the
state. It is as if Congress purported to purchase a subsidiary owned
by a private joint-stock corporation by obtaining the consent of the
subsidiary's CEO (or, for that matter, its mailroom personnel or
secretarial pool). If Congress can so freely define what it means for
an institution to consent, then the concept of consent loses its justif
icatory force.
Rather than accept such radical reworkings of spending clause
jurisprudence, I offer a more modest explanation for the result in
the case. As explained below, one can reconcile Lawrence County
with the more general spending power jurisprudence by viewing the
decision as an instance in which the Court enforced the presump
tion of institutional autonomy.
To understand this presumption, it is necessary to distinguish
between two different limits that state law might impose on state or
113. See David E. Engdahl, The Spending Power, 44 DUKE L.J. 1, 74-76 (1994) (criticizing
Lawrence County as implicitly assuming that Congress can use grants to enlarge powers of
local government) .
114. See id.
115. See supra note 112.
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local officials. First, state law might prohibit certain types of activi
ties because the states' lawmakers (by which I mean constitutional
conventions as well as the state legislature) believe that the local
government is unfit to pursue the activity, regardless of how the
activity is funded. For the sake of convenience, I shall refer to these
limits as "regulatory limits" on local discretion. So, for instance, a
state's constitution might bar public school teachers from entering
the physical premises of private parochial schools to provide those
private schools' students with special educational services. Such a
prohibition would apply regardless of how the teacher's services
were :financed:

the state simply regards such mixing of public

school teachers and private religion as an undesirable mixing of
church and state. Likewise, a state may refrain from bestowing the
power to enact zoning ordinances on county governments in order
to avoid excessive regulation of land use. Again, the source of the
funds used by a county for zoning enforcement is irrelevant to this
prohibition: the state prohibits all such activity regardless of how it
is funded.
One can usefully distinguish such regulatory prohibitions on lo
cal governments' activities from a second type of limit on local dis
cretion, in which the state lawmakers have no particular objection
to any local activity but instead wish to redirect federal revenues so
they are expended on activities favored by the state lawmakers. I
shall refer to such limits as "revenue-enhancing" limits on local dis
cretion, because their purpose is simply to enhance the state's fiscal
condition. The classic example of "revenue-enhancing" state laws
is the state offset rules reducing state aid to school districts by pre
cisely the amount of federal "impact aid" that such school districts
receive.116 These state offset rules do not identify any specific pol
icy as inefficient or inappropriate: the school districts can still pur
sue any policy they please - just with less federal money. The
purpose of the state offset rules, therefore, is not the regulatory su
pervision of local discretion but rather simply the state legislature's
desire to confiscate federal grant revenue.

Lawrence County presents a harder case. On one hand, one
could argue that the state redirection of federal PILOT money was
merely revenue-enhancing:

nothing in the state law regulating

county use of PILOTs suggested that there were substantive poli116. See Carlsbad Union Sch. Dist. v. Rafferty, 300 F. Supp. 434 (S.D. Cal. 1969);
Hergenreter v. Hayden, 295 F. Supp. 251 (D. Kan. 1968); Triplett v. Tiemann, 302 F. Supp.
1244 (D. Neb. 1969); Douglas lndep. Sch. Dist. v. Jorgenson, 293 F. Supp. 849 (D. S.D. 1968);
Shepheard v. Godwin, 280 F. Supp. 869 (E.D. Va. 1968).
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cies with which counties could not be entrusted, for the state law
did not bar counties from pursuing any policy with county revenue.
On the other hand the state law did not single out federal grant
revenue alone for state control: it applied to state PILOT revenue
as well.117 One might, therefore, characterize the state law as a reg
ulatory measure designed to constrain county discretion over all
nonsource revenue. In general, one can distinguish between regula
tory and revenue-enhancing limits on local governments' power
with the following rule of thumb: if the state law limits local gov
ernments' actions only to the extent that those actions are funded
by federal grants and not otherwise, then the state law is a revenue
enhancing measure.

Otherwise, the state law is a regulatory

measure.
This distinction between regulatory and revenue-enhancing
state laws defines the scope of the presumption of institutional au
tonomy in the following ways. First, as a matter of construing fed
eral grant legislation, when the federal government bestows federal
revenues directly on local governments (for instance in the form of
community development block grants, revenue sharing, impact aid,
or payments in lieu of taxes); then courts should presume that, by
bypassing the state legislature and bestowing federal revenue di
rectly on the local government recognized by the state constitu
tion, 118 Congress intended to exclude state legislatures from
imposing revenue-enhancing limits on local discretion over federal
funds. So, for instance, federal district courts were correct to disre
gard state laws offsetting state aid by the amount of federal impact
aid that such districts received. Likewise, although it is a closer
case, the Lawrence County Court may have acted properly by
presuming that Congress intended to bar the South Dakota legisla
ture from redistributing sixty percent of the federal grant from the
county to school districts, because South Dakota's law was a
revenue-enhancing measure and the South Dakota Constitution
recognized the county government as a constitutionally protected
policymaking institution.119 Second, concerning remedies for viola
tions of grant conditions, the presumption of institutional autonomy
would presume that local governments should have standing to
117. S.D. CooIFIED LAWS § 5-11-6 (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1998).
118. I explain the reason for limiting the presumption to constitutionally recognized local
governments at infra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
119. See S.D. CoNST. art. IX, § 2 (authorizing counties to adopt home-rule charters). The
constitutional recognition need not involve immunity from legislative action: it is sufficient
that the state constitution simply create the institution and bestow powers on it that, absent
state legislative action, can be exercised to initiate policies.
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challenge such state-law limits and that courts should not simply
declare the local government ineligible to receive federal funds but
should instead enjoin the revenue-enhancing state law that inter
feres with local discretion. Thus, Lawrence County correctly held
that the revenue-enhancing state law reallocating the federal
PILOT grant should simply be set aside.
2.

The Justification for the Presumption of Institutional
Autonomy in the Context of Federal-Local Grants

Why adopt such a construction of grant programs? The pre
sumption can be defended in terms of policy, legislative context,
and precedent, although the argument rooted in policy is the least
ambiguous of the arguments.
As argued in section I.B, the intergovernmental system benefits
from intergovernmental competition between state and local gov
ernments. The trend toward state centralization, however, reduces
such competition, in part for such pernicious reasons as maximiza
tion of state governments' patronage opportunities, prestige,
budget, etc. The presumption in favor of institutional autonomy
would counteract this trend by giving local governments greater
control over federal grant revenue, free from state regulation that
would redirect such revenue to projects chosen by the state legisla
ture. By bestowing federal revenue on local governments, the fed
eral government creates a constituency - local politicians and their
intergovernmental organizations - with a vested interest in lobby
ing to preserve control of such revenue.
The system of federal grants, in other words, is not merely the
effect of lobbying of various nonfederal governments and organiza
tions: it is also a cause of such lobbying. Such federal revenue pays
the salaries of local officials who then become a potent force to
continue the program; it pays benefits to local constituents who also
lobby for the continuation of the program.120 Federal-local grants
120. See, e.g., THOMAS J. ANroN, AMERICAN FEDERALISM AND PuBLic POLICY: How
SYSTEM WoRI<S 68-70 (1989) (describing how federal grants create local capacity for

TiiE

local governments to participate in intergovernmental system by improving their ability and
incentive to apply for further federal aid); DERTHICK, supra note 21, at 56-58 (describing how
a federal social security old-age program stimulated the creation of a lobby in Massachusetts
to expand the program). For a recent example of this tendency, see Stephen Glass, Anatomy
of a Policy Fraud: The Hollow Crime Bil� THE NEW REPUBLIC, Nov. 17, 1997, at 22, 23-24
(describing how federal grants for extra police gives municipalities an incentive to hire lobby
ists to extend life of program). The multiplication of intergovernmental lobbies with an inter
est in federal programs need not increase the total amount of intergovernmental aid. To the
contrary, by dividing aid among several levels of nonfederal governments, Congress can en
courage nonfederal governments to lobby against the other nonfederal institutions' access to
aid. For instance, municipalities' efforts to redirect federal revenue sharing from state gov-
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thus give intergovernmental organizations and nonfederal officials
a reason to focus their attention on Washington, D.C.121 So, for
instance, the National Conference of Mayors arose in part because
the Roosevelt administration offered federal aid directly to cities,
giving big city mayors like Frank Murphy and Fiorello LaGuardia a
political incentive to lobby in Washington.122 County commission
ers who receive federal PILOT funds likewise have a greater incen
tive to monitor congressional activities to ensure that they do not
lose control of such funds.
Why is it desirable to multiply the intergovernmental organiza
tions interested in federal largesse? One hypothesis of this article is
that such participation of different nonfederal institutions in the in
tergovernmental lobbying game is a useful way to constrain any sin
gle set of nonfederal institutions from acting strategically. As each
category of nonfederal institutions develops a capacity to adminis
ter federal programs and an interest in lobbying for control over
federal revenues, Congress becomes less dependent on any single
governmental entity for information about the costs of intergovern
mental programs. If any single entity becomes recalcitrant, then
Congress can redirect federal money to a different and more com
pliant nonfederal institution. If this hypothesis is correct - and
admittedly it must be taken as merely plausible absent rigorous em
pirical confirmation - then grant systems that diffuse federal reve
nue among competing nonfederal institutions might also plausibly
cultivate the sort of intergovernmental competition that makes the
system of cooperative federalism function most efficiently.
One must be careful, however, to qualify this argument in favor
of encouraging fragmentation of state institutions and subdivisions.
There will obviously come some point at which the costs of frag
mentation and intergovernmental competition will exceed their
benefits.

In particular, there is a danger that, if any state agency or

field office could compete for federal revenue, then the state gov
ernment's central supervising agencies - the governor or key legis
lative committees - would be deprived of the capacity to engage in
emments to themselves led them to be sharply critical of state management of such aid criticism which led to the termination of such aid for all nonfederal governments. See Ste
phen Farber, Federalism and State-Local Relations, in A DECADE OF DEVOLUTION: PERSPEC.
TIVES ON STATE-LoCAL RELATIONS, supra note 64, at 27, 39-40.
121. See ADVISORY CoMMN. ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, REPORT A-54, THE
INTERGOVERNMENTAL GRANT SYSTEM AS SEEN BY LoCAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL OFFICIALS
113 (1977) (noting that "the greater the agency's Federal aid dependency, the more contacts
exist [between the state and federal agency]").
122. See MICHAEL I. GELFAND, THE NEW DEAL AND THE CmEs 23-70 (1975) (describing
the founding of the National Conference of Mayors during the 1930s).
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comprehensive budgeting.123 One might be confronted by the spec
tacle of district attorneys, state agencies' field offices, subagencies,
and even individual state officers applying for and receiving federal
grants without any preclearance from the governor or state budget
director. In theory, such individuals or agencies could then use the
conditions in the federal grant legislation to prevent the requisite
supervising agent or agency from asserting centralized control over
the federally funded institution, eliminating the possibility of com
prehensive budgeting by the only institutions capable of surveying
all of the states' programs and establishing some sort of priority
among them.124
To avoid such a disintegration of the state into a bundle of unco
ordinated bureaucratic fiefdoms, one must limit the scope of the
presumption of institutional autonomy: not just any state or local
official should be authorized to apply for federal grants and then
use the conditions in the grant to liberate him- or herself from state
control. The easiest rule might be to limit the presumption to state
subdivisions or departments the existence of which is recognized by
the state constitution - for instance, counties, townships, school
districts, municipalities, and a few state executive agencies like state
universities, the state fish and game commissions, and elected state
officials such as the attorney general.125 As a practical matter, such
a rule would ensure that the presumption applied only to those
123. For examples of this worry, see ASSEMBLY WAYS & MEANs CoMM., NEw YoRK
STATE LEGISLATURE, APPROPRIATING FEDERAL FUNDS: A PROPOSAL FOR NEW YORK
STATE (Dec 6, 1976), reprinted in Role ofState Legislatures in Appropriating Fed. Funds to
States, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intergovernmental Relations ofthe Senate Comm. on
GovtL Affairs, 95th Cong. 9-11 (1977) [hereinafter Hearings](describing instances in which
highly specialized state agencies will liberate themselves from comprehensive budgeting
through grant applicatiqns).
124. For defenses of comprehensive budgeting as a way to promote express consideration
of the relative merits of old and new programs, see AARoN WILDAVSKY, THE PoLmcs OF
THE BUDGETARY PROCESS 136-37 (4th ed. 1984). For an example of a state law promoting
comprehensive budgeting, see ALA. CODE §§ 41-19-1 to 41-19-12 (Michie Supp. 1994) (Ala
bama Budget Management Act). At the federal level, comprehensive budgeting has been
promoted by various statutes and legislative rules. For a review of these mechanisms, see
Kate Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 76 CAL.
L. REv. 593 (1988).
125. The number of executive offices created by the state constitution will tend to vary
with the age of the constitution and political culture of the state. State constitutions that are
older or derive from what Elazar calls "traditionalistic" or "individualistic" political cultures
will tend to have numerous independent and elected state executive officials, reflecting popu
list distrust of executive power. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. § 112-114 (creating eight elected state
wide executive offices); ARK. CoNsT. art. VI, § 1 (creating seven elected state-wide offices).
By contrast, constitutions that have been recently updated, especially in "moralistic" political
cultures that are more trustful of vigorous governmental action, tend to create a unified exec
utive branch with power concentrated in a single elected governor assisted by a lieutenant
governor. See, e.g., HAw. CoNST. art. V, §§ 1-6. On the definition of political cultures among
the states, see ELAZAR, supra note 65, at 112-31.
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agencies that are normally assumed by state legislators to have a
presumptive power to apply for federal funds and generally initiate
policymaking within their jurisdiction. Of course, assuming that the
state constitution permitted such legislation, the state legislature ,
could impose stricter limits by requiring even constitutionally rec
ognized state and local institutions to preclear grant applications
with the state government.
Why should the presumption apply only to state laws that at
tempt to redirect federal grant revenue to state-favored interest
groups?

The reason is rooted in the fact that these revenue

enhancing laws are least likely to be related to the efficient supervi
sion of local governments. As argued in Part I, local governments
require considerable supervision, because their regulations can eas
ily impose external costs on nonresidents. State governments are
simply more capable than the federal government of providing the
best level of supervision. To presume that state governments can
not place any limits on local governments' use of federal grants
would be to eliminate such useful supervision. Therefore, it is pru
dent not to employ the presumption of institutional autonomy to
state laws that absolutely and unconditionally prohibit local govern
ments from engaging in certain activities deemed undesirable by
the state government. If, for instance, state law withholds from
counties the power to enact zoning regulations, then the counties
should not obtain such a power simply because the federal govern
ment has bestowed an unrestricted grant on the county: the federal
government is not as well-suited as the state government to assess
the likelihood that counties will use such a power to impose exter
nal costs on nonresidents (through, say, so-called "exclusionary
zoning" that eliminates opportunities for affordable housing).
These considerations about preserving state supervisory control
do not apply as strongly, however, to revenue-enhancing regula
tions that do not prohibit any local activity as inefficient or other
wise undesirable.

If the state law constrains local government

discretion only to the extent that the local government's activities
are funded by federal revenues, then the natural inference is that
the state legislature is motivated by a desire to control federal reve
nue, and not a desire to correct some institutional weakness of the
local government. For instance, state offset rules that effectively
deprive school districts of their federal impact aid do nothing to
restrict school districts' power over own-source revenues generated
by the local millage. If there were some institutional flaw in school
district governance that needed correcting, then one would expect
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that the state legislature would more systematically reform the local
government. But, if the state legislature simply deprives the school
districts of their federal money, then one reasonably infers that the
state legislature is not concerned about any weakness in local gov
ernments' structure or incentives but instead wishes only to confis
cate federal grants for its own purposes. Such state rules represent
the needless centralization of control over federal revenue, and
courts should construe federal law to bar such centralization.
One might agree that the presumption is sensible as a matter of
policy. But why is it good law? What conventional sources of legal
authority support such a canon of construction?
The legislative context of direct federal-local grant programs
supports the presumption of institutional autonomy. The congres
sional decision to bypass state legislatures and send federal funds
directly to local governments during the New Deal126 and later dur
ing the Johnson and Nixon administrations was a fundamental
transformation of American federalism.127 The fight among gover
nors, mayors, counties, and townships for federal dollars has always
been highly partisan (Republicans favoring the states and Demo
crats favoring the cities),128 mapping onto the politics of race and
poverty. In the words of Senator Muskie, state governments were
thought to be "unsympathetic [to] the problems of urban areas. "129
Congressional decisions to use local rather than state agents are, in
short, deliberate and well-informed, and they usually are accompa
nied by intense intergovernmental controversy. Given this legisla
tive context, it seems sensible to employ the presumption of
institutional autonomy as a default rule for construing federal-local
grant programs: when Congress specifies localities as the recipients
of federal money, it really means localities and not the state gener
ally. In this respect, Justice White's analysis of the federal PILOT
program in Lawrence County more accurately captures the flavor of
such federal-local relations than does Justice Rehnquist's dissenting
opinion invoking Hunter.
126. See GELFAND, supra note 122.
127. See Catherine Lovell, Community Development Block Grant: The Role of Federal
Requirements, PuBLIUS, Summer 1983, at 85.
128. The controversy is most famously illustrated by the struggle between the governors
and mayors during the 1970s for control over block grants and revenue sharing funds. For a
summary of this controversy, see CoNLAN, supra note 12, at 59; HAIDER, supra note 56, at 77117; Farber, supra note 120, at 27-49.
129. Hearings, supra note 123, at 63. The tendency for Democrats to distrust state gov
ernments and favor cities continued into the Reagan administration. See REAGAN AND nm
CITIES (George E. Peterson & Carol W. Lewis eds., 1986).

March 1999]

Dissecting the State

1245

What about the remedies for violation of grant conditions pro
vided by the presumption of institutional autonomy? Even assum
ing that federal grants to local governments ought to be construed
to exclude revenue-enhancing state regulations, why should the
remedy for such state laws be invalidation of those laws? Why
should not courts instead declare that the local government is ineli
gible for federal funds?
The answer to this objection is rooted in the definition of the
presumption of institutional autonomy - the application of the
presumption only to revenue-enhancing state laws. By definition,
such laws are not enacted because the lawmaker has any objection
to the local program authorized by the federal government and im
plemented by the local government. The state law is not designed
to stop any pernicious local behavior but simply to expropriate fed
eral funds for goals that the state government values more highly.
Given these assumptions, it is eminently reasonable to presume
that, if faced with the choice between the loss of federal grant reve
nue altogether and the loss of the power to redirect such revenue
for purposes rejected by Congress, the state lawmakers would pre
fer the loss of the latter and would waive its revenue-enhancing
conditions on the federal grant. After all, if the state were to lose
the federal grant altogether because of noncompliance with grant
conditions, it would a fortiori lose its power to reallocate the grant
for the purpose of enhancing state revenues. Therefore, the default
rule that most accurately captures the state lawmakers' probable
intent is the rule that such lawmakers would sooner surrender their
capacity to impose revenue-enhancing measures on local govern
ments than prevent their local governments from obtaining any fed
eral grant revenue at all.
When state laws serve regulatory rather than revenue-enhancing
purposes, however, the presumption of institutional autonomy is in
appropriate: rather than enjoin such regulatory state limits on local
discretion when they are inconsistent with federal grant conditions,
the Court should remand the case to the trial court to give state
officials an opportunity to withdraw from the federal grant pro
gram. So, for instance, in Wheeler v. Barrera, 13o the Court was con
fronted with the question of whether Missouri's refusal to allow
public school teachers to provide special education services in paro
chial schools violated the terms of Title I of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act. The Court held that Missouri could
130. 417 U.S. 402 (1974).

1246

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 97:1201

achieve compliance with the federal grant program either by pro
viding comparable special education services to students of private
and public schools or by simply withdrawing from the federal pro
gram and declining federal special education money.131 In such a
case, there is a genuine question about whether state lawmakers either the state legislature or the state constitution's framers would prefer to receive federal revenue or would rather maintain
regulatory restrictions on school districts.

The appropriate re

sponse of the courts, therefore, is to remand the case to the trial
court so that the responsible state officials litigating the case have
an opportunity to withdraw from the federal program rather than
waive a restriction that they might value more highly than federal
revenue.132
By failing to recognize the distinction between regulatory and
revenue-enhancing state laws, courts may unwisely allow local gov
ernments to liberate themselves unilaterally from state control sim
ply by accepting federal grants inconsistent with such control. The
dangers of this misguided approach toward federal grant programs
is well-illustrated by the decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit in United States v. City ofNew Haven.133 In New
Haven, the City of New Haven accepted a $750,000 grant from the
Federal Aviation Administration to extend an airport clear zone
into the territory of the neighboring town of East Haven. The Sec
ond Circuit held that the federal grant authorized New Haven to
extend the clear zone even though Connecticut law expressly pro
hibited such airport expansion unless the governing body of the
town in which the land was located consented to the expansion.134
The regulatory purpose of the prohibition was obvious: airport ex
pansions impose extraordinary costs on neighbors, and cities that
131. See Wheeler, 417 U.S. at 425.
132. This is not to say that courts should never enjoin state laws inconsistent with federal
grant conditions. If the state government itself, through statute enacted by the state legisla
ture, has expressly acceded to such conditions, then it might be perfectly appropriate to en
join state laws inconsistent with the terms under which federal money has been awarded to
the state government. In King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 {1968), for instance, the Court enforced
federal grant conditions governing Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) by
simply enjoining Alabama's "substitute father" rule limiting eligibility for AFDC assistance.
In King, the Alabama legislature had already assented to participate in the AFDC program
by submitting a plan to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare {HEW) and ac
cepting federal revenue even after the HEW had promulgated the "Flemming Ruling" out
lawing the "substitute father" regulation. In effect, the Court simply enforced the "contract"
between Alabama and the federal government with the remedy of specific performance. See
Allanson S. Willcox, The Function and Nature of Grants, 22 ADMIN. L. REv. 125, 133 {1969).
133. 447 F.2d 972 {2d Cir. 1971).
134. See New Haven, 447 F.2d at 973.
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expand airport facilities into neighboring municipalities may well be
subsidizing their own economic development by effectively confis
cating property values from nonvoting nonresidents. Nevertheless,
the Second Circuit reasoned that, under the Supremacy Clause,
state law could not interfere with this federal-local agreement gov
erning the use of navigable airspace.135
This article maintains that New

Haven's holding was wrong as a

matter of law and policy. The power of the federal government to
preempt state laws under the Supremacy Clause depends on the
state's voluntary acceptance of federal money, and Connecticut had
never accepted any federal grant. Moreover, there is no reason to
assume that Connecticut would prefer to waive its regulatory limit
on towns' condemnation powers to enrich one town at the expense
of another.136 The Second Circuit should have followed the proce
dure later suggested by

Wheeler: it should have remanded the case

to the trial court with instructions that the state government should
be permitted to intervene so that the state, not the city, could de
cide whether or not to forfeit the grant or waive the state law limit
ing

New

Haven's

powers.

Once

the

State

of

Connecticut

determines that the costs of airport expansion exceed the benefits,
the final decision concerning the powers of the City of New Haven
ought to have been reserved to the State of Connecticut: the pre
sumption of institutional autonomy, after all, is only a presumption
and not an irrebuttable one.
The presumption of institutional autonomy also helps answer a
second question that occasionally excites judicial controversy - the
issue of whether local governments should have standing to enforce
the terms of federal grant programs against the state government.
Courts sometimes hold that local governments should lack such
standing because they are "creatures of the state" that are incapa
ble of asserting rights against the government that created them.137
This reasoning, however, is confused. As noted above in section
I.A, while

Hunter might bar local governments from asserting fed-

135. See New Haven, 447 F.2d at 973-74.
136. State governments were acutely aware of the danger that municipal airports might
impose spillover effects on nonresidents. During the 1945 hearings on the Civil Aeronautics
Act, the Council of State Governments urged that federal money for airports be channelled
through the states to ensure that an impartial level of government would arbitrate such dis
putes. See RoscoE C. MARTIN, THE CITIES AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 95 (1965).
137. See Indian Oasis-Baboquivari Unified Sch. Dist. No. 40 v. Kirk, 91 F.3d 1240, 1242
(9th Cir. 1996); City of East St. Louis v. Circuit Court, 986 F.2d 1142, 1144 (7th Cir. 1993);
Village of Arlington Heights v. Regional Transp. Auth., 653 F.2d 1149, 1152 (7th Cir. 1981)
(holding that the municipality lacks standing to challenge state law under Fourteenth
Amendment).
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eral constitutional rights against the state government, this conclu
sion hardly implies that local governments cannot enforce federal
statutes against state governments. If Congress intends local offi
cials to serve as federal agents responsible for implementing federal
law, then there is no sensible reason why such officials cannot en
force the federal grant program against the state. They are, after
all, the officials with the greatest vested interest in protecting their
discretion under the federal grant program: federal agencies may
likely underenforce federal grant conditions relating to local auton
omy, either because they lack the resources to monitor state com
pliance or because they wish to preserve their resources for other
battles deemed more important to the success of the program.
Therefore, whenever the federal government gives local govern
ments a role to play in implementing federal programs, courts
should presume that those local governments have standing to pro
tect this role.
One might argue, however, that such a rule for construing
federal-local grant legislation flies in the face of Supreme Court
precedents like Gregory v. Ashcroft, 138 which require federal stat
utes to be construed to preserve rather than erode state autonomy.
In Gregory, the Court refused to construe ADEA's ban on
mandatory retirement to invalidate state laws requiring the retire
ment of state judges at the age of seventy. Given the importance of
state autonomy as an element of constitutional structure, the Court
reasoned that it could not construe ADEA to work such an intru
sion into state governments' internal structure unless such a result
was required by ADEA's plain language.139 In short, the Court
normally interprets ambiguous federal statutes to favor rather than
limit state autonomy. Why, then, should one construe ambiguous
grant statutes to restrict the powers of state legislature to impose
revenue-enhancing laws?
One might answer this question by noting that the presumption
of institutional autonomy is rooted in precisely the same sort of rea
soning as Gregory. The conventional defense of Gregory is that, by
requiring Congress to overrule state autonomy expressly and
clearly with a plain statement, Gregory's "plain statement" rule
helps to protect federalism through the national political process congressional markup, debates, committee reports, etc. The Court
might deploy such an indirect strategy for protecting federalism be138. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
139. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 470.
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cause the Court might lack a clear legal standard for determining
when intrusions on state autonomy go too far, and the Court also
might lack confidence in the judicial capacity to make the complex
empirical judgments necessary to evaluate whether judicially im
posed doctrines of state autonomy will excessively impede Con
gress's legitimate national powers. By encouraging Congress to
confront these issues, Gregory's "plain statement" rule allows the
Court to sidestep these difficulties, in effect delegating their solu
tion to interest groups seeking national action, who must make the
case before Congress for express intervention in state political
structure.140
But one can defend the presumption of institutional autonomy
with a mirror image of this reasoning: while Gregory uses a plain
statement rule to protect federalism through the national political
process, the presumption of institutional autonomy uses a plain
statement to protect nationalism through the states' political
processes. The presumption, after all, does not give Congress an
unlimited power to dissect the state and liberate local officials from
the control of the state legislature. The state legislature remains
free to bar cities and counties from applying for federal grants if the
state constitution permits such a prohibition: the only requirement
is that the state legislature must speak clearly by specifying that lo
cal governments' failure to comply with state law should render
those local governments ineligible for federal money.

As with

Gregory, the presumption of institutional autonomy can be justified
as a way to ensure that the political process - the state political
process - carefully considers an important constitutional value effective national spending programs - before foreclosing local
participation in those programs.
Moreover, the same concerns that motivate indirect protection
of federalism through a plain statement rule in Gregory also suggest
similar indirect protection of nationalism through a plain statement
rule. After all, just as the Court might be reluctant to give the
states the power to resist generally applicable laws such as the
ADEA, so too, as explained in sections I.A and B, the Court might
be reluctant to give Congress an unlimited power to dissect the
state. The precedential basis for such a power is uncertain and the
140. For a defense of this sort of reasoning, see Ann Althouse, Variations on a Theory of
Normative Federalism: A Supreme Court Dialogue, 42 DUKE LJ. 979, 1006·07 (1993). For a
less sanguine opinion about Gregory, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi·
Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REv.
593, 62945 (1992).
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empirical consequences of such dissection of the state might be
harmful. The Court can avoid such a potentially dangerous exten
sion of national power by requiring state legislatures to speak
plainly if they wish to exercise their prerogative to withdraw their
local governments from federal intergovernmental arrangements.
Thus, just as Gregory allows the Court to avoid the controversial
extension of federalism norms by requiring Congress to exercise its
powers of national supremacy with a plain statement, so too does
the presumption of institutional autonomy allow the Court to avoid
the controversial extension of Congress's powers by requiring state
legislatures to exercise their powers of state supremacy - their
supremacy over local governmental institutions - with a plain
statement.141
Such a "plain statement" rule provides a powerful protection to
Congress. In theory, a state legislature might require its local gov
ernments to preclear all applications for federal money with some
central state agency. Likewise, state legislatures might simply enact
a blanket rule that local governments shall be ineligible for federal
grants whenever they fail to comply with all state laws. In practice,
however, one would expect state legislatures to be extremely reluc
tant to limit local governments' capacity to engage in "grantsman
ship," as any such limit will impose onerous financial burdens on
the state's citizens: local government initiative in seeking federal
money is an important source of revenue for the state.142 Espe
cially if the state legislature has merely a revenue-enhancing motive
for controlling federal-local grants, one would expect that the state
legislature would prefer to waive such controls rather than confess
to the electorate that it wished to deprive the voters of federal
money.143

141. For a helpful discussion of the relationship between "substantive" constitutional Iiin
its and "procedural" requirements that legislative bodies make findings or otherwise deliber·
ate about constitutional matters, see Philip P. Frickey, The Fool on the Hill: Congressional
Findings, Constitutional Adjudication, and United States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. REs. L. REV.
695 (1996).
142. Local offcials' support for intergovernmental transfers is frequently critical for in·
ducing Congress to enact such measures. See, e.g., TIMOTHY CONLAN, FROM NEW FEDERAL
ISM TO DEVOLUTION: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF INTERGOVERNMENTAL REFORM 67-68, 222
(1998) (describing importance of Mayors' lobbying efforts for enacting General Revenue
Sharing and defeating Clinton's block grant proposals).
143. There have been several instances in which state legislatures have decided to elimi
nate legislative preclearance for grant applications simply because such preclearance
presented too great an administrative headache for the legislature. See Carol S. Weissert,
State Legislatures and Federal Funds: An Issue of the 1980s, Pusuus, Summer 1981, at 67,
72-73.
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Admittedly, the presumption of institutional autonomy has not
been expressly defended in any judicial opinion (although it is im
plicitly suggested by Lawrence County). Nevertheless, such a
"plain statement" rule bears a family resemblance to other judi
cially created "plain statement" rules governing local governments'
immunities from federal law. Consider, for instance, local govern
ments' immunity from antitrust liability under Parker v. Brown.144
In a series of opinions, the Supreme Court has held that the Parker
doctrine, which exempts state legislative programs from the scope of
federal antitrust laws, does not automatically protect local govern
ments from antitrust liability.145 In order for local governments to
enjoy such an exemption from federal antitrust laws, local govern
ments must act pursuant to a "clearly articulated" state policy "to
displace competition with regulation or monopoly public ser
vice. "146 In effect, the Court has held that, while Congress has con
ferred immunity from antitrust lawsuits on state governments, state
governments cannot delegate this immunity to their local govern
ments unless the state legislature issues a plain statement clearly
endorsing local governments' anticompetitive conduct.147
The presumption of institutional autonomy provides an analo
gous "plain statement" rule, albeit one that enhances, rather than
detracts from, local governments' powers. The presumption de
fended here provides that local governments should enjoy the bene
fit of federal-local grants, absent clear state laws denying such local
authority. By contrast, City of Boulder provides that, absent clear
state laws authorizing local anticompetitive polices, local govern
ments do not enjoy the federal benefit of antitrust immunity.148
While the two "plain statement" rules cut in opposite directions,
both address the same fundamental issue: the level of state legisla
tive supervision of nonfederal governmental officials that is consis
tent with those officials' exercise of federally derived powers. It
144. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
145. See City of Columbia Adver., Inc. v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365
(1991); FISher v. City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260 (1986), rehg. denied, 475 U.S. 1150 (1986);
Town of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34 (1985); Community Communications Co. v.
City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982); City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435
U.S. 389 (1978) (plurality).
146. See City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 413; see also City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 52.
147. Admittedly, recent opinions make clear that the state legislature's "plain statement"
need not be all that plain. For instance, the Court has held that the state has articulated local
governments' exclusion of competition against existing billboard owners when the state legis
lature simply enacts a zoning enabling act authorizing the regulation of land uses such as
billboards. See Omni Outdoor Adver., 499 U.S. at 372.
148. See City of Boulder, 455 U.S. at 52-55 (holding that authorization in state constitu
tion's home rule provision was insufficiently precise to bestow Parker immunity on city).
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should hardly be surprising that the proper default rule should vary
with the purposes of the federal program. In the context of federal
antitrust policy, the Court best protects the federal program by re
quiring close state legislative supervision of local governments. Af
ter all, as Justice Brennan noted repeatedly in City of Lafayette,
local governments pursuing "maximum benefits for the community
constituency"149 are likely to regulate "without regard to extra
territorial impact and regional efficiency,"150 in pursuit of "their
own parochial interests."151 By contrast, when Congress bestows
money directly on local governments, the proper background as
sumption is that Congress's policy will be best advanced by presum
ing exclusion of state control of the money.
But note that, whether the "plain statement" rule encourages or
discourages state legislative control of local governments' exercise
of federal powers, the default rule preserves the principle of state
supremacy. Regardless of the default rule, the state legislature re
mains free to deprive its subdivisions of both Parker immunity and
the power to apply for federal grants-in-aid. Both presumptions, in
short, preserve the essential element of state supremacy over
nonfederal governments while simultaneously promoting the na
tional interest in cooperative federalism.
In sum, the result in Lawrence County makes sense as an exam
ple of the presumption of institutional autonomy. When local gov
ernments receive federal revenue directly from the federal
government, the courts ought to presume that the state government
has no right to enhance its own revenues by regulating the alloca
tion of the federal grant. The proper remedy, moreover, ought to
be injunction of the state revenue-enhancing law. This presumption
of local control, however, ought not to apply to any regulatory state
laws that define the powers and jurisdiction of local governments
without regard to the source of revenue funding local government
activities. The principle of state supremacy requires the courts to
give state lawmakers the last word about whether local govern
ments will act as agents of the federal government, and the pre
sumption of institutional autonomy is well-calculated to give the
state such control.

149. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 403.
150. City ofLafayette, 435 U.S. at 404.
151. City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 408.
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B. Construing Federal Grant Programs and State Constitutional
Provisions to Protect Intragovernment Competition Between State
Executive and Legislative Branches
The federal government does not dissect the state simply by lib
erating local governments from state law. Federal grants-in-aid
have also liberated state executive officials from the control of state
legislatures. As explained below, such federal empowerment of
governors has its uses: it can increase intragovernmental competi
tion for federal revenue, which can, in turn, reduce the ability of
state governments to engage in inefficient strategic behavior when
negotiating over the content and implementation of intergovern
mental regulatory schemes.
1.

The History of Struggles Between Legislatures and Governors
for Control Over Federal Grants

Before one attempts any evaluation of executive control over
federal grants, it is important to have a brief overview of how the
federal government has historically dissected the state, freeing state
agencies from the control of state law. During the 1960s, both Con
gress and federal agencies generally preferred to bestow grant
funds on nonelected professionals - officials who specialized in the
delivery of a particular service and, although nominally under the
control of state politicians, were insulated from political control by
civil service rules as well as by professional loyalties that often
made them more loyal to their federal counterpart agency than to
the state legislature or governor.152 Throughout the 1960s and
1970s, mayors and governors struggled against such insulation of
appointed agency experts from their control. Swallowing many of
their differences with each other, state and local executive politi
cians succeeded in persuading both Congress and the President to
give them greater control over federal funds.153 Nixon's successful
promotion of block grants and revenue sharing effectively gave
elected executive "generalists" new power over federal revenue at
the expense of the appointed policy "specialists."
152. For instance, the grant programs of Johnson's creative federalism strongly en
couraged such control of federal funds by state agency "specialists" with "single-agency" re
quirements, thus requiring federal grants to be controlled by an agency specializing in the
delivery of the particular service that Congress wished to encourage. See WRIGHT, supra
note 12, at 83-86.
153. See CoNLAN, supra note 74, at 67 (describing "lingering suspicions and bitterness"
that afflicted relations between governors and mayors).
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The success of the elected executive officials, however, ushered
in a new stage of intragovernmental competition among elected
policy generalists: by the mid-1970s, state legislators began to fight
with governors for greater control of federal grant revenue.154 'fyp
ically, state legislatures asserted such control by appropriating fed
eral grants with varying degrees of specificity and barring governors
(or other state executive officials) from expending any federal reve
nue above the amounts specifically appropriated for purposes ap
proved by the state legislature.
Such legislative efforts to control federal money met with mixed
success, for both practical and legal reasons. In four states, the
state supreme courts ruled that state legislatures were legally
barred from appropriating such federal grant revenue.155 The state
courts were not completely clear about whether the source of this
limit on state legislatures' powers was the state constitutional "sep
aration of powers" doctrine, federal grant conditions, or some com
bination of both.156 In any case, state legislators lobbied Congress
to amend federal grants to ensure that state legislatures exercised
ultimate control over the federal funds.157 But, despite these pleas
and a significant 1977 decision in favor of state legislative control by
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court,158 Congress has done little to
clarify the role of state legislatures in appropriating federal
grants.159 Moreover, even in states where state legislative appropri154. See WruaHT, supra note 12, at 276.
155. See Navajo Tribe v. Arizona Dept. of Admin., 528 P.2d 623 (Ariz. 1975); MacManus
v. Love, 499 P.2d 609 {Colo. 1972); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 378 N.E.2d 433
{Mass. 1978); Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 524 P.2d 975 (N.M. 1974).
156. These decisions' reasoning tended to be ambiguous as to the precise source of the
limit on state legislative power: they reasoned that such appropriation was barred by state
constitutional "separation of powers," because the grants came impressed with a federal pur
pose that the executive branch was charged with executing. Such a "separation of powers"
argument, however, seemed to collapse into an argument about the federal conditions at
tached to the federal grant by Congress: in effect, the state courts seemed to argue that
Congress intended the revenue to be controlled exclusively by governors. For a summary of
such arguments, see George D. Brown, Federal Funds and National Supremacy: The Role of
State Legislatures in Federal Grant Programs, 28 AM. U. L. REv. 279, 285-87 (1979).
157. In 1977, Edmund Muskie, chair of the Senate Subcommittee on Intergovernmental
Relations held hearings on legislative oversight of federal funds at which the majority of
witnesses - primarily state legislators and the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental
Relations - called for greater state control of federal grant revenue. See Role ofState Legis
latures in Appropriating Federal Funds to the States: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Inter
governmental Relations of the Senate Comm. on Govt. Affairs, 95th Cong. (1977).
158. See Shapp v. Sloan, 391 A.2d 595 {Pa. 1978).
159. The state legislatures' most salient victory occurred in 1995, when, at the urging of
the National Conference of State Legislatures, U.S. Senator Hank Brown successfully spon
sored the "Brown Amendment" to the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF)
block grant program, a provision providing that state legislatures could appropriate federal
block grant revenue for temporary assistance or for child care. The Brown Amendment pro-
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ation might be legally permissible, many states use only the vaguest
open-ended appropriations to allocate federal grants, relying on ex
ecutive agencies to allocate the funds among subprograms.160
State legislators typically defend a greater state legislative role
in the allocation of federal grants as a way to ensure that some state
agency comprehensively compares and ranks competing specialized
state agencies' proposals for expenditure of grant revenue.161 Ab
sent a requirement of state legislative appropriation, state officials
might continue programs with federal funds even after the state leg
islature has terminated state funding for such programs.162 Worse
yet, such state agencies might even practically commit the state leg
islature to continue to provide state funds for such programs be
cause the existence of federal funding would create a class of
program beneficiaries and officials who would lobby on behalf of
continued state matching funds in order to retain federal money.163
Based on these CO:Q.cerns, both the Advisory Commission on Inter
governmental Relations (now defunct) and state legislatures have
vided that "[a]ny funds received by a State under the provisions of law specified in [TANF]
shall be subject to appropriation by the State legislature, consistent with the terms and condi
tions required under such provisions of [TANF]." See Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193 § 901, 110 Stat. 2105, 2347
(1996), quoted in 42 U.S.C. § 601 app. (1998). This provision did not conclusively resolve all
of the ambiguity concerning state legislative control even in the narrow context of the TANF
program: at most, it declared that state legislatures could "appropriate" TANF funds, with
out specifying how much or what sort of appropriation was "consistent with the terms and
conditions of [TANF]."

160. Five state legislatures - Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, and New Mex
ico - still do not appropriate federal grant revenue at all but rather allow the governor or
executive agency to apply for federal grants and spend it free from direct legislative over
sight. An additional seven states - Alabama, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, North Carolina, West
Vrrginia, and WISconsin - provide only open-ended authorizations for executive agencies to
spend federal funds: these states place no cap on the federal grant revenue that an agency
can expend, and they do not appropriate federal grant revenue to specific subprograms ad
ministered by the grant-obtaining agency. Minnesota sometimes appropriates specific
amounts of federal grant revenue for specified federal programs. Minnesota, however, pro
vides an "open and standing" authorization for state agencies to expend federal funds. Texas
and Utah allow the expenditure of unanticipated federal funds. See LEGISLATIVE FINANCE
PAPER No. 98: LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT OF FEDERAL FUNDs 6-7, 9 (1995) (written by Ar
turo Perez for the National Conference of State Legislatures).
161. See Hearings, supra note
Intergovernmental Relations).

123, at 79-85

(statement of the U.S. Advisory Commn . on

162. See, e.g., AssEMBLY WAYS & MEANS CoMM., supra note 123, at 9-12. This state
report describes instances in which the state legislature terminated state funding for various
agency activities - travel expenses for state university researchers, high school instructional
projects, psychiatric treatment for youth, etc. - only to have the agencies make up the
shortfall with federal grant revenue.
163. See Hearings, supra note 123, at 22-26 (noting that "employees, local organizations,
recipients of services" funded by federal matching grants form a "constituency" that lobbies
against discontinuing the program).
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recommended legal reforms to increase the power of state legisla
tures over federal funds.164
I argue that these proposals for total legislative control over fed
eral grant revenue are overstated. Comprehensive budgeting might
well be needed, but there is no reason why governors and state
budget officers cannot provide it in as competent a manner as legis
lative finance committees.165 This is not to say that state legisla
tures should not play a significant role in controlling federal grants
- they should. As explained in section II.A of this article, how
ever, the intergovernmental system may work best when no single
state institution exercises a monopoly over federal money. When
state institutions compete with each other to secure federal reve
nue, one improves the odds of faithful state adherence to state
federal bargains. In sections II.B.2 and 3 below, I explain how the
presumption of institutional autonomy might be used to construe
the powers of governors over federal grants. As suggested below,
such a presumption might enable the federal government to exploit
competition between state legislators and governors to minimize
strategic behavior by either institution.
2.

The Definition of the Presumption of Institutional Autonomy
in the Context of Federal Grants to Governors
Before one attempts to justify the presumption, it is helpful to

explain more fully what the presumption would require. What ex
actly does it mean to promote the diffusion of power among state
institutions where federal grants are concerned?

Consider, first,

how courts could increase the power of governors through their
construction of state constitutional principles: courts could allow
governors to disregard state legislative appropriations of federal
grant revenue that are inconsistent with the implementation plan
164. ACIR recommended a model state bill and model state constitutional amendment,
requiring that the state legislature appropriate federal grant funds to specific subprograms
and prohibit agencies from expending grant funds above these appropriated amounts without
legislative approval. See Hearings, supra note 123, at 98-111. The state legislatures con
curred with these recommendations - but they also argued that federal statutes be amended
to include state legislatures as the co-recipient of federal grant revenues so that courts would
not construe federal grant programs to give governors exclusive control over federal funds.
See id. at 59 (statement of Representative James Ritter, Chair, Federal-State Relations
Comm., Pa. House of Representatives).
165. See .ADVISORY CoMMN. ON lNrERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, supra note 121, at
96-100 (cataloguing the ways in which state budget officers and governors review executive
agencies' grant applications). ACIR's survey showed that, out of 34 state budget officers
responding to the survey, 13 precleared all grant applications, while 20 precleared some grant
applications of subordinate state agencies. 1}7pically, state governments do not preclear the
grant applications of the state's public universities.
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submitted by the governor to obtain the grant. Such a rule would
benefit governors simply because the governor is the official most
responsible for drafting and submitting implementation plans to
federal agencies: state legislatures typically play little role in the
grant application process. By binding the state to adhere to the
plan, the presumption of institutional autonomy would enable gov
ernors to use the implementation plan as a way to appropriate fed
eral grants for purposes that would trump later contrary legislative
appropriation.
So, for instance, suppose that a governor submits an implemen
tation plan to the Department of Health and Human Services
(HHS) in order to obtain a block grant under the Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. The TANF stat
ute gives states the option of seeking an exemption from work re
quirements for mothers with children younger than one year.166 If
the state plan provides that the state applies for this exemption and
state law is otherwise silent on the issue of the exemption, then,
after the state receives the block grant, the state legislature ought to
be barred from appropriating the TANF block grant revenue in
ways that would require mothers with infants to seek employment
in order to receive assistance.167 The presumption of institutional
autonomy, in other words, would allow the governor's plan to de
prive the state legislature of an appropriation option that would
otherwise be allowed to the legislature by federal law. In effect, the
governor and not the state legislature would speak for "the
state. "168
It is important to emphasize that the practical effect of such a
limit on the state legislature's appropriation power would probably
depend on the remedy available for illegal appropriations. The
remedy of merely withholding federal funds from noncomplying
state legislatures might be entirely ineffective: one can imagine that
few governors or federal agencies would be willing to scuttle federal
funding for a program in order to enforce implementation plans
against recalcitrant state legislatures. If the federal agency could

enjoin the inconsistent appropriation measure and simply bestow
the federal grant on the governor as, in effect, a lump-sum appro166. Pub. L. No. 104-193, §103.A.407(b)(5), 110 Stat. 2105, 2131 (1996).
167. This precise controversy occurred in Colorado when Governor Roy Romer sought
the exemption for mothers with infants, over the objections of key legislators in the State
Assembly. Eventually, the governor backed down and withdrew the application of the
exemption.
168. I discuss the ambiguities of the TANF legislation at infra notes 169-172.
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priation, then the limit on the legislature's power to appropriate
federal grants would be quite significant.
It is important as well to note that, despite the proposed limit on
the state legislature's power to appropriate federal grant revenue,
state legislatures would still have at least three different ways to
control federal grants. First, the state legislature would retain the
power to enact substantive legislation requiring the inclusion or ex
clusion of elements - exemptions from work requirements for
mothers with infants in TANF plans submitted to the IIBS - in
any state implementation plan submitted to a federal agency.169
Thus, the governor could not commit the state to the implementa
tion of federal law in ways that contradicted substantive state legis
lation. Second, the state legislature still could appropriate federal
grant revenue in ways that did not contradict the implementation
plan submitted by the state government. H the governor, therefore,
submits a vague implementation plan to the federal agency, then
the legislature will have plenty of room to control the allocation of
federal funds in the interstices of the state's plan. Finally, the state
legislature still could control any federal grants for which the fed
eral government required matching state dollars, simply by refusing
to appropriate the required state contribution and thereby prevent
federal dollars from being directed to programs to which the state
legislature objected.170
These means of legislative control are significant, but they do
not render nugatory the gubernatorial power provided by the pre
sumption of institutional autonomy. The state legislature in theory
could prevent the governor from ever submitting an implementa
tion plan contrary to the state legislature's views simply by enacting
a substantive statute barring such an application. In practice, how
ever, it will be practically and legally difficult for a state legislature
- a multi-member body with multiple contending factions - to
use substantive statutes to determine the multitude of operational
details of federal programs. The governor will, therefore, have sig
nifi.cant power to fill in the gaps of substantive legislation in his or
169. This technique has been used primarily with federal assistance dollars. Under both
the AFDC and the recently enacted TANF, federal law provided states with the option of
applying for "waivers" from federal requirements and seeking "exemptions" from certain
otherwise applicable requirements - say, the requirement that women with children under
the age of one year obtain employment. Governors and state legislatures have fought major
political struggles over whether or not to apply for such relaxation of federal regulatory
standards.
170. This is how Colorado legislature controls all federal grants awarded on a matching
basis. The Colorado legislature has no power to appropriate federal grants directly under the
state constitution.
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her administration of the federal grant.171 The state legislature may
attempt to reduce obstacles to collective action by delegating over
sight of grant applications to a special committee of key legislators.
Under many state constitutions, however, such a delegation would
violate principles of separation of powers.172
3.

The Justification for the Presumption of Institutional
Autonomy in the Context of Grants to Governors

Why use the presumption of institutional autonomy to give gov
ernors the power to constrain state legislative power over federal
grant revenues? As with the presumption of local autonomy de
fended in section II.A.2, I justify the presumption of gubernatorial
autonomy in terms of sensible policy, judicial doctrine, and the leg
islative history of grant programs.
As suggested in section II.A, competition between nonfederal
governmental institutions can sometimes promote efficiency in the
intergovernmental system by reducing the costs of monitoring
nonfederal agents of the federal government. I maintain that the
presumption of institutional autonomy might produce precisely this
sort of efficiency by allowing the federal agency to pit the governor
and legislature against each other, lending weight to one or the
other institution depending on their fidelity in implementing federal
policies. If the governor is willing to submit a detailed implementa
tion plan to the federal agency, then, under the presumption of in
stitutional autonomy, such a plan would trump the appropriation;
moreover, the remedy for illegal appropriations would be injunc
tion of the appropriation measure and award of the grant directly to
the governor as an unallocated lump sum. Thus, if the federal
agency supports the governor's plan, then the federal agency can
enjoin later state legislative appropriations that the agency deems
to be less faithful to the goals of the federal program.
On the other hand, if the governor submits a vague or unsatis
factory plan to the federal agency, then the federal agency can re171. The governor also has a greater power to veto a piece of substantive legislation than
a state appropriations measure allocating federal grants. By vetoing an appropriations mea
sure, the governor would be depriving the federal grant program's beneficiaries of federal
dollars. This consequence makes gubernatorial use of such vetoes politically unpalatable. By
contrast, given the default rule that governors do not require express state authorization to
apply for federal grants, if the governor vetoes substantive legislation, the availability of fed
eral (or, for that matter, state) revenue is unaffected. In the substantive context, in other
words, the default rule is gubernatorial power.
172. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 532 A.2d 195 (Mass. 1987); General Assembly v.
Byrne, 448 A.2d 438 (NJ. 1982); People v. Tremaine, 168 N.E. 817, 822 (N.Y. 1929); Tucker
v. South Carolina Dept. of Highways and Pub. Transp., 424 S.E.2d 468 (S.C. 1992).
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frain from enforcing the plan and instead allow the state legislature
to appropriate the grant for its own purposes. In effect, the pre
sumption allows the federal agency to choose whether to give fed
eral funds to the state legislature or governor, based on which
institution most faithfully proposes to carry out the federal pro
gram. Moreover, the competition for control of federal funds pro
vides the federal agency with a practical sanction: rather than
simply withdraw federal funds from the noncomplying state - a
course of action that would actually undermine the federal program
- the agency can simply accept or preempt the state legislature's
appropriation, delivering the federal funds to the state branch most
willing to carry out the program according to terms acceptable to
the federal agency, without harm to

the federal program's

beneficiaries.
The presumption of institutional autonomy, therefore, promises
significant advantages in preventing strategic behavior by state gov
ernments. But, apart from its benefits as a matter of policy, what is
the basis for the principle in federal or state law? Is this presump
tion a plausible way to construe either federal grant legislation or
state constitutions in light of judicial doctrine, statutory or constitu
tional text, and legislative history?
Candor requires one to acknowledge the ambiguity of the usual
sources of authority: the presumption is neither obviously required
nor precluded by either the text, or judicial interpretations, of fed
eral statutes or state constitutions. Moreover, the answer would
vary immensely depending on the particular grant program or state
constitution that one analyzes. Nevertheless, the presumption of
institutional autonomy makes at least as much sense as rival ac
counts: federal grant statutes and state constitutions do not ex
pressly give state legislatures any absolute right to appropriate
federal grant dollars in disregard of the governor's plan, but neither
do they deprive state legislatures of all power over such grant
revenue.
Federal statutes typically bestow federal grants on state execu
tive agencies or governors; outside the context of general revenue
sharing, these laws are usually silent about the role of state legisla
tures.173 But such silence should not be read to exclude state legis173. The recent exception to this practice has been the so·called Brown Amendment,
which provides that two block grants "shall be subject to appropriation by the State legisla
ture, consistent with the terms and conditions required under [the block grant provisions]."
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104193, § 901, 110 Stat. 2105, 2347 (1996), quoted in 42 U.S.C. § 601 app. (1998). Congress re
peated similar language in 29 U.S.C. § 2941(a) (1998), providing that block grants for job
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latures' role in appropriating federal revenue. Federal agencies
have occasionally taken such an extreme view, arguing that the stat
ute's reference to the governor as the applicant for federal funds
precludes legislative involvement in the allocation of such
money.174 This extreme position, however, is hard to justify: noth
ing in the legislative history suggests a conscious congressional deci
sion to exclude legislative involvement. Rather, the evidence
suggests that Congress accidentally overlooked state legislatures
rather than deliberately excluded them. As the OMB noted in

1980, Congress and federal agencies simply find it easier to locate a

single state executive official in charge of policymaking relevant to
some federal grant.175 Because the "interface" between federal and
state governments takes the form of a state executive official, it is
natural for federal agencies and Congress to assume that such an
official really constitutes the state government when designing fed
eral grant programs.
Therefore, there seems little reason to exclude all legislative ap
propriation of federal grants as a matter of federal law. Congress
·

simply has no history of deliberately favoring governors over state
legislatures in the same way that Congress has favored local govern
ments over state governments with certain direct federal-local grant
programs. But, at the same time, it would be equally odd to argue
that the state legislature has some unlimited power to appropriate
federal grants, regardless of the terms of implementation plan sub
mitted by the governor. The grant program, after all, is analogous
to a fee-for-service contract under which the state government un
dertakes to advance some federally favored goal in return for fed
eral money. No court has ever doubted that the state is bound to
honor the terms of this "contract" when it accepts federal money.176
But the terms to which the state agrees when it accepts the money
are most obviously embodied in the implementation plan submitted
to and accepted by the federal agency.177 Of course, the effects of
training "shall be subject to appropriation by the state legislature, consistent with the terms
and conditions required under [the Workforce Investment program]."
174. See CoMPTROLLER GENERAL (GAO), FEDERAL AssrsrANCE SYsrEM SHOULD BE
CHANGED TO PERMIT GREATER !NvoLVEMENT BY THE STATE LEGISLATURE 23-27 (GGD81-3 Dec. 15, 1980).
175. See Letter from Wayne G. Granquist, Associate Dir., Management & Regulatory
Policy, OMB, to Wrlliam J. Anderson, Director, GAO (Aug. 11, 1980), in App. IV, CoMP
TROLLER GENERAL, REPORT TO THE CoNGRESS: FEDERAL AssrsrANCE SYsrEM SHOULD BE
CHANGED TO PERMIT GREATER !NvoLVEMENT BY STATE LEGISLATURES app. IV (GGD-813 Dec. 15, 1980).
176. See, e.g., Oklahoma v. Civil Serv. Commn., 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947).
177. As the Court has noted, "there would be no reason to require a State to submit
assurances to the [federal agency] if the statute did not require the State's findings to be
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the presumption of institutional autonomy would depend on the ac
tual language of the particular federal grant legislation. The pre
sumption is, after all, only a rule of construction. In unusual cases
such as the Block Grants Section of the TANF program,178 it might
be extremely difficult to argue that the governor's plan should limit

the state legislature's power to appropriate the grant. Section 417

of the TANF legislation, after all, provides that "[n]o officer or em
ployee of the Federal Government may regulate the conduct of
States under this part or enforce any provision of this part, except
to the extent expressly provided in this part."179 One might argue
that this provision bars any federal agency or court from enforcing
the governor's implementation plan against the contrary wishes of
the state legislature.180 Even in the case of TANF, however, there
remains ambiguity about which branch of the state government
truly speaks for "the state." If the governor wishes to enforce his or
her own implementation plan against a contrary state legislative ap
propriation, it is not obvious that the federal agency must regard
the appropriation rather than the plan as the authoritative voice of
the state. Congress certainly wanted to bar federal agencies from
interfering excessively with state administration of the TANF pro
gram.181 It is a little more ambiguous whether Congress intended
to bar governors from exercising primary control over federal
monies.182
In short, one can make a respectable - but not irrebuttable -

argument that, at least absent language like section 417 of TANF,
federal grant programs permit state legislatures to appropriate fed
eral grant dollars - but only in ways that are consistent with the
implementation plan submitted by the state. But what about state
reviewable in some manner by the (federal agency]." Wiider v. Vrrginia Hosp. Assn., 496
U.S. 498, 514 (1990).
178. Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 103, 110 Stat. 2105, 2112-61 (1996).
179. § 103.A.417, 110 Stat. at 2159.
180. See Carl Thbbesing & Sheri Steisel, Answers to Your Welfare Worries, STATE LEGIS·
LATURES, Jan. 1997, at 12 (arguing that "(t]he state plan does not have the effect of law and
can be modified at any time").
181. See Cynthia R. Farina, On Misusing "Revolution" and "Reform": Procedural Due
Process and the New Welfare Act, 50 ADMIN. L. REv. 591, 620 (1998) (noting that welfare
reform "was lobbied for by, and sold to, the states
content from the national to the local level").

as

a devolution of control over program

182. While the TANF legislation includes the Brown Amendment authorizing state legis
lative appropriation of TANF money, this authorization is limited to appropriations "consis
tent with the terms and conditions required under (the Block grant provisions]." See supra
note 173. One such term and condition is that the state submit a plan to implement the
TANF program.
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constitutions? Should they be construed to bar or limit legislative
appropriation of federal grants?
State courts have offered two extreme answers to this question,
both of which

(I

argue) are equally mistaken. One answer, pro

vided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, is that the state legisla
ture's power to appropriate federal grants is unlimited. According
to this view, the state legislature can appropriate federal grants
even in ways that are inconsistent with the implementation plan
submitted by the governor to obtain the grant from a federal
agency.183 The second answer, provided by four other state courts,
is that state constitutional "separation of powers" doctrines prohibit

any legislative appropriation of federal grants.184 As I argue below,
both of these theories are not required by law and make terrible
policy.
Consider, first, the position of Shapp v.

Sloan185 that state legis

latures ought to have unlimited powers to appropriate federal
grants. In

Shapp, the State Justice Commission, appointed by Gov

ernor Milton Shapp, filed a law enforcement plan with the Federal
Law Enforcement Assistance Administration in order to receive a
block grant under the Law Enforcement Assistance Act (LEAA).
The commission's plan called for the continued funding of the
Pennsylvania Office of Special Prosecutor, an official who was then
conducting a grand jury investigation into allegations of political
corruption in Philadelphia.186 The state legislature, however, en
acted statutes barring any expenditure of federal grant revenue
without a specific legislative appropriation of such revenue for a
particular program.187 The legislature then failed to appropriate
any of the federal grant to fund the Office of the Special
Prosecutor .188
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the legislature's re
fusal to appropriate funds for the special prosecutor did not violate
the terms or conditions under which the grant had been awarded.189
The court apparently reasoned that the proposals contained in the
state's law enforcement plan did not constitute conditions on the
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

See infra notes 185-93 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 194-98 and accompanying text.

391 A.2d 595 {Pa. 1978).

See Shapp, 391 A.2d at 610 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
See Shapp, 391 A.2d at 600-01.
See Shapp, 391 A.2d at 601.
See Shapp, 391 A.2d at 606 ("As long as . . . the terms and conditions proscribed by
the Congress are not violated, there is no inconsistency between the provisions of the federal

programs and state legislative administration of the funds." (emphasis added)).
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expenditure of federal funds that the state was bound to honor.
But, as noted above, this is an odd way to regard the state's imple
mentation plan: there is little point to the plan if it can be casually
disregarded by the state once the state obtains the money. The
court also noted that the state constitution required all funds to be
deposited in the state's general fund and be expended only accord
ing to an appropriation.19° But this provision - common in state
constitutions191 - hardly suggests that the legislature's power of
appropriation should be unlimited by other principles of law - say,
the state constitution, federal grant conditions, or the governor's
implementation plan. Finally, the Shapp Court worried that, if the
legislature could not appropriate federal funds, then the governor
could "use federal funds to establish and finance one system of
agencies . . . without the approval or authorization of the very body
which is constitutionally empowered to set up and finance state
plans for education or law enforcement."192 This is certainly a justi
fiable worry that I discuss below,193 but, again, it is not obvious that
the legislature can avoid executive tyranny only by ignoring state
implementation plans.
Going to the opposite extreme, four state supreme courts have
held that state legislatures cannot appropriate federal grants at all,
even in ways that are consistent with the implementation plan sub
mitted by the governor to the federal agency.194 Such courts reason
that federal grant revenues are "custodial" funds that are "im
pressed with a trust" imposed by Congress, a trust with which the
state legislature cannot interfere.195
This view that all appropriation must be prohibited is as mis
guided as the opposite view of Shapp that all appropriation must be
allowed. The implicit assumption of these decisions seems to be
that the governor somehow has the exclusive role of ensuring that
federal grants are spent in compliance with federal conditions.
Although the state courts are vague about the basis for this doc190. See Shapp, 391 A.2d at 600-01.
191. See infra note 204.
192. Shapp, 391 A.2d at 605.
193. See supra notes 166-72 and accompanying text.
194. See Navajo Tribe v. Arizona Dept. of Admin., 528 P.2d 623 (Ariz. 1975); MacManus
v. Love, 499 P.2d 609 (Colo. 1972); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 378 N.E.2d 433
(Mass. 1978); Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 524 P.2d 975 (N.M. 1974).
195. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 378 N.E.2d at 436. For a general discussion of the
decisions' reasoning, see George Brown, Federal Funds and National Supremacy: The Role
of State Legislatures in Federal Grant Programs, 28 AM. U. L. REv. 279, 288-90 (1979).
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trine,196 one might infer that these courts regard the implementa
tion of Congress's grant conditions as an inherently administrative
task. By using appropriation to define how the governor must use
federal funds, the state legislature is, therefore, usurping the gover
nor's prerogative to control administration of government. The ju
dicial prohibition on legislative appropriation of federal grants,
therefore, resembles judicial doctrines barring appropriation meas
ures that micro-manage executive departments and thereby deprive
governors or executive agencies of all meaningful discretion in the
carrying out of legislative instructions.197
This view of grant administration, however, flatly ignores the
broad policymaking discretion that Congress bestows on state gov
ernments when it provides them with federal revenue. One cannot
deem this discretion to be merely "administrative" discretion be
cause, in some abstract sense, Congress imposes some general pur
pose on the federal revenue: Congress's specification of some
general purpose in the grant legislation - especially block grant
legislation - leaves enormous room for state policymaking. Thus,
it is hardly surprising that even state courts that generally bar legis
lative appropriation of federal gr�ts have not adhered faithfully to
their own "nonappropriation" doctrine.19s
The presumption of institutional autonomy provides an alterna
tive to such rigid and unworkable distinctions between "administra
tive" and "legislative" tasks. Rather than try to allocate control
over federal grants according to such formulae, the presumption al
lows both the legislature and the governor to compete for control
over such revenue, just so long as each uses the means appropriate
to its institution.

So, for instance, the state legislature has the

196. For instance, the Massachusetts Supreme Court stated conclusorily that "the [fed
eral] money is impressed with a trust and is not subject to appropriation by the Legislature."
Opinion of the Justices, 378 N.E.2d at 436. The court made no effort to explain why the
legislature would be incapable of carrying out the "trust."
197. See, e.g., Chaffin v. Arkansas Game & Fish Commn., 757 S.W.2d 950 (Ark. 1988)
(stating that legislative appropriation for state game and fish commission cannot dictate to
commission how much money to spend on magazine); Communications Workers of Amer. v.
Florio, 617 A.2d 223 (N.J. 1992) (holding that state legislature cannot use appropriations to
define which categories of government employees should be laid off).
198. See, e.g., Colorado Gen. Assembly v. Lamm, 738 P.2d 1156 (Colo. 1987) (stating that
governor has exclusive power to allocate federal grants among programs but legislature has
exclusive power to transfer portions of block grants between departments). This decision is
rooted in the Court's earlier decision, Colorado Gen. Assembly v. Lamm, 700 P.2d 508 (Colo.
1985). When confronted with the enormous discretion possessed by state governments in
managing federal funds, the Colorado Supreme Court has attempted to cabin the implica
tions of its anti-appropriation doctrine by barring governors from transferring federal block
grant revenues between different state departments without authorization from the state
legislature.
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power to enact substantive legislation prohibiting or requiring par
ticular elements in the governor's application for federal grants.
Assuming that the legislature can override the governor's veto, the
principle of state supremacy provides that such control through
substantive legislation is the prerogative of the legislature. On the
other hand, if the state legislature is silent concerning the gover
nor's application for grants, then the governor should have the pre
rogative to control the federal grant according to the terms of the
implementation plan that he or she submitted: in such a case, the
governor's choices can be deemed "administrative," for they do not
offend any properly enacted legislative policy but rather fill the
gaps of legislative silence.199
Under this theory of competitive joint control, the state legisla
ture's later appropriation of the federal revenue obtained by the
governor should not be precluded out of hand. Nor should courts
attempt to divine some ideal division of responsibility over the
funds based on some a priori theory of gubernatorial or legislative
competence. Instead, the appropriation should be evaluated ac
cording to the plan submitted by the governor. If the plan does not
leave the decision open, then the appropriation should be enjoined.
If the plan leaves the choice open, then there is no reason to pre
clude legislative control. Indeed, such an opportunity for later ap
propriation gives the federal agency an opportunity to compare the
governor's "bid" for control of federal revenue with a rival "bid" the state legislature's appropriation measure - to decide which
proposal best advances federal purposes. Such intragovernmental
competition is not calculated to violate the federal "trust" but
rather to ensure that state officials more faithfully execute their fed
eral responsibilities.
Such a procedural resolution of the clash between the governor
and state legislature is consistent with the way in which state consti
tutions normally allocate executive and legislative powers. Rather
than define which decisions are "administrative," state courts typi
cally limit legislative interference with governors' decisions by en
forcing nondelegation doctrines analogous to the Supreme Court's

199. Such a theory of gubernatorial powers is analogous to the state-law doctrine fol
lowed in "strong governor" states, like New York, that when the legislature fails to specify
how revenues are to be allocated, the governor can determine the allocation among sub
programs. See Alliance for Progress v. New York State Div. of Hous. & Community Re
newal, 532 N.Y.S.2d 821 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988); New York Pub. Interest Group v. Carey, 390
N.Y.S.2d 236 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976).

doctrines in
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the state legislature from delegating review of governors' choices to
special committees or legislative officers.202 Furthermore, the pre
sumption of institutional autonomy does not prevent the state legis
lature from forbidding or requiring the governor to apply for
federal grants in a particular way; rather, the presumption requires
only that the state legislature exercise such a prerogative in a partic
ular manner - through substantive legislation or appropriations
consistent with the state's implementation plan.
To be sure, such a doctrine limits legislative appropriation of
federal grants in troubling ways. As Kate Stith has noted, the bar
ring of any executive expenditure without express appropriation
forces legislators to oversee executive officials closely so as to pre
vent unauthorized governmental actions.203 By allowing governors
to receive federal grants without such appropriation, the presump
tion of institutional autonomy eliminates such oversight. Of course,
even if the state legislatures do not appropriate federal grants, Con
gress does: it is possible that such congressional oversight would
satisfy the state constitutional requirement that any money with
drawn from the state treasury be an appropriation "made by law"
(or words to this effect).204 But even if congressional appropriation
is legally sufficient, one might doubt whether it is practically effec
tive at stopping executive abuse: as suggested in section LB, there
are good reasons to believe that such federal supervision would be
less effective than supervision by the state legislature.
Nevertheless, there are at least three reasons to believe that
such a limit on state legislatures' power of the purse is consistent
with state constitutional notions of separation of powers. First, the
governor can achieve such independence from the state legislature
200. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
201. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
202. See, e.g., General Assembly v. Byrne, 448 A.2d 438 (N.J. 1982); Tucker v. South
Carolina Dept. of Highways and Pub. Transp., 424 S.E.2d 468 (S.C. 1992) (barring county's
legislative delegation from exercising legislative veto over governor's highway projects within
county); West Vrrginia v. Hechler, 462 S.E.2d 586 (W. Va. 1995) (barring legislative veto of
agency rules).
203. See Kate Stith, Congress' Power of the Purse, 91 YALE L.J. 1343, 1356-60 (1988).
204. See, e.g., A.LA. CONST. art. IV, § 72; A.LA.sKA CONST. art. IX, § 13; ARK. CONST. art.
V, § 29; CAL. CONST. art. XVI, § 7 (West's Ann. 1996). Only two of these clauses - in the
Constitutions of New Mexico and Delaware - suggest that the "law" in question must be
enacted by the state legislature rather than by Congress. See DEL. CoNST. art. VIII, § 6
(requiring appropriation by "Act of the General Assembly"); N.M. CONST. art. IV, § 30 (re
quiring appropriation by "the legislature"). The practice in both states, however, is not to
appropriate federal grants. Indeed, the New Mexico Supreme Court seems to bar such ap
propriation. See New Mexico ex rel Sego v. Kirkpatrick, 524 P.2d 975 (N.M. 1974).
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only by submitting an implementation plan that is sufficiently de
tailed to preclude later state appropriations. If the governor sub
mits a vague plan to maximize his or her discretion, then the
legislature's ability to appropriate the grant will not be substantially
affected, because such appropriations will likely be consistent with
the nebulous terms of the plan. But governors will likely be reluc
tant to sacrifice their discretion by submitting an overly detailed
plan; there are, therefore, political pressures that preserve the legis
lative power to appropriate the grant revenue. Second, even if the
governor's plan is extraordinarily detailed, the federal agency may
choose not to enforce the plan if the later legislative appropriation
is deemed to be equally consistent with federal policies. Assuming
that the federal agency has exclusive power to enforce the plan,
governors will be unable to use the plan to constrain legislative ap
propriations when the appropriations do not depart substantially
from federal policies. Third, the state legislature can always bar the
governor from carrying out policies that the legislature opposes
simply by enacting substantive legislation that constrains the gover
nor's ability to apply for federal funds or bars specific gubernatorial
policies. At most, the presumption of institutional autonomy sim
ply creates a default rule under which the governor can apply for
and control federal grant revenue if the state legislature is silent.
This is a significant power, but it does not free the governor from
state legislative control if there is a consensus among legislators that
gubernatorial policies are excessively costly.
In short, the presumption of institutional autonomy's basic re
quirement that state legislative appropriations of federal grants
comply with state implementation plans is probably consistent with
the best reading of both federal grant programs and most state con
stitutions. Given the diversity of both federal grants and state con
stitutions, one must be careful of overgeneralizing.205 Neverthe
less, to the extent that any generalization is possible, the presump
tion seems consistent with federal and state law.
The more difficult issue is how to remedy legislative departures
from the state's implementation plan. Should the court enjoin the
illegal appropriations measure and allocate the federal grant as a
lump-sum appropriation to the governor? Or should the court in
stead simply withhold some percentage of federal funds? The arti205. For instance, in states with traditions of strong gubernatorial offices - such as New
Jersey and New York - the limit on state legislative appropriation may seem trivial. In
states like Colorado, where the governor has few powers over the budget, the limitation may
be more significant.
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cle has already noted that, as a matter of policy, the remedy of
injunction is crucial: without it, the federal agency's power to en
force the state's implementation plan could be an empty power, as
few federal agencies would withdraw federal funds from noncom
plying state legislatures. But why is such a remedy consistent with
the prevailing doctrines governing grant programs? The withhold
ing of the federal revenue might be a more legally appropriate sanc
tion, given that the state has no obligation to participate in the
federal scheme at all - and, indeed, has a constitutional entitle
ment not to participate.
The short answer to this question is that the Court has fre
quently enforced conditions on federal grants simply by enjoining
state laws inconsistent with those conditions.206 In effect, such a
remedy is analogous to the remedy of specific performance in the
context of breach of private contracts. One might argue that having
accepted the federal funds, the state is obliged to carry out its part
of the intergovernmental bargain and not merely provide restitu
tion of the money that it accepted.207

But, as with Lawrence
County, this answer is a bit unsatisfactory: the contractual analogy

is problematic, because the governor rather than the state legisla
ture accepted federal funds. Why, then should the legislature's
appropriations measure be set aside to accommodate the guber
natorial plan that the legislature never approved?
To resolve this question, one should look to the purpose of a
legislative appropriation. Using the terminology laid out in section
II.A.1, one might ask whether the appropriation of federal grants is
intended to be regulatory or revenue-enhancing. The principle of
state supremacy guarantees to the legislature the power to escape
conditions attached to federal funds by forgoing those funds.
Therefore, if the state legislature intends to withdraw from a federal
grant program by appropriating the funds in ways inconsistent with
the state's own implementation plan, then the proper remedy would
be simply to deprive the state of the grant. This, however, would be
an odd way to interpret a measure appropriating a federal grant:
the very point of an appropriations measure is to retain federal
money, not abandon it. If the legislature were actually confronted
206. See Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968).
207. In cases where the state legislature has agreed to participate in a federal program
but has failed to appropriate either federal grant revenue or state matching funds, state
courts have occasionally argued that the state legislature is obliged to appropriate the neces
sary revenue. See Coalition For Basic Human Needs v. King, 654 F.2d 838 (1st Cir. 1981);
Kimble v. Solomon, 599 F.2d 599 (4th Cir. 1979); Knoll v. White, 595 A.2d 665 (Pa. Commw.
1991).
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with the choice of seeing the state lose the federal grant altogether
or foregoing its power to appropriate the grant, the state legislature
might choose the latter alternative. If so, the remedy most consis
tent

with

state

legislative

intent

would

be

to

ignore

the

appropriation.
Given the ambiguity of appropriations measures, the ideal rem
edy would help clarify whether the legislature intends to withdraw
from the federal program and forgo federal funds when it appropri
ates grant revenue in ways inconsistent with the state's own plan.
But this consideration suggests that withholding grant revenue is a
poor sanction with which to enforce state implementation plans.
The problem with such a remedy is that, as explained in section

II.A, it is so draconian that it would likely deter both governors and
federal agencies from filing lawsuits to enforce the state implemen
tation plans. After all, the withholding of federal revenue would
damage the very program that the federal agency is trying to ad
vance. The court would, in effect, destroy the state's implementa
tion plan in the course of enforcing it.

This possibility might

encourage canny legislatures to appropriate federal grants in ways
inconsistent with the state's plan, in hopes that the federal agency
would be deterred from challenging the noncompliance by the se
verity of the sanction. In short, far from helping to clarify the state
legislature's intentions, the sanction of withholding federal funds
might actually encourage state legislatures to conceal strategically
their willingness to comply with the terms under which federal reve
nue is awarded to the state.
By contrast, the remedy of awarding the grant directly to the
governor free from the state legislature's appropriation would elim
inate the federal agency's and the governor's disincentive to en
force the implementation plan. Such a remedy does not force the
state legislature to participate in the federal program against its
will: if the legislature wishes to withdraw from the federal program,
then it can do so with substantive legislation barring the governor
from applying for or accepting the federal grant.
In sum, allowing the federal government to dissect the state in
the administration of federal grant programs has some advantages.
By playing local governments off against the state, or the governor
off against the state legislature, the federal agency can reduce the
possibility that any nonfederal officer responsible for federal pro
grams will violate the terms of their intergovernmental agreement.
Such dissection need not violate the principle of state supremacy,
just so long as state lawmakers designated by the state constitution
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can ultimately refuse to participate in some scheme of cooperative
federalism. The presumption of institutional autonomy defended
here only limits the

needless centralization of the state to ensure

that, absent the clear command of state law, federal agencies will be
able to take advantage of comp�tition for federal revenue between
state and local officials.
III.

CONSTRUING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS' POWERS TO Acr AS
FEDERAL AGENTS

Federal grant programs are not the only context in which the
federal government dissects the state. Controversies about whether
and how federal law can liberate state or local officials from the
constraints of state law arise whenever federal law authorizes
nonfederal officials to undertake actions that are unauthorized by
state law. As argued in section I.B, when state law unambiguously
prohibits the actions, then the principle of state supremacy bars
such actions. The question, however, is more difficult when state
authorization is ambiguous. Some state-law doctrines such as Dil
lon's Rule208 would suggest that, absent express state authorization,
the local officials' action ought to be barred. Should such doctrines
apply to official action that is expressly authorized by federal law
when state law authorization is ambiguous?

In this final Part of this article, I examine two controversies in
volving such ambiguity:

first, the dispute between the City of

Tacoma and the State of Washington over the City's construction of
a dam that would flood the State's fish hatchery,209 and second, the
State of Connecticut's efforts to prevent the City of Bridgeport
from filing for bankruptcy under Chapter IX of the federal bank
ruptcy statute.210 In both of the controversies, the cities success
fully invoked federal law to preempt state laws or policies limiting
their discretion. I argue that these results make sense, because nar
row construction of local governments' powers are inappropriate
when the federal government has authorized local action. This is
not to say that the state legislature should not be able to veto such
federal-local cooperation. One can argue on the basis of both pol
icy and doctrine, however, that local officials should be presump
tively entitled to implement federal law just so long as state law
does not expressly forbid the local action.
208. See infra note 222.
209. For the complex series of decisions, see supra note 19.
210. In re City of Bridgeport, 128 B.R. 688 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1991).
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Federal Authorization for Municipal Projects That
Impose Spillover Costs Outside the Municipality:
The City of Tacoma's Dam and
Other Unneighborly Behavior

In 1948, the City of Tacoma applied to the Federal Power Com
mission for a license to build two dams on the Cowlitz River, a trib
utary of the Columbia. The two dams were significant projects.211
But the smaller dam (measuring 240 feet above bedrock) caused

the most controversy, because it would flood a salmon hatchery
owned by the State of Washington. Accordingly, the Washington
State Fish and Game Departments, represented by the State
Attorney General, intervened before the Federal Power Commis
sion to oppose the City's application for a license. The State argued
that Washington's statutes required Tacoma to obtain permission
from the State to construct any dam storing more than ten acre
feet. Moreover, state law also prohibited the construction of any
dam over twenty-five feet high if the dam would block the migra
tion of anadromous fish. Finally, the State argued that Tacoma sim
ply lacked the power to condemn the State's hatchery by flooding
it, because state law did not confer upon cities the power to con
demn state-owned land already dedicated to a public use.212
The Federal Power Commission disagreed in an opinion that
was later upheld by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
and affirmed by the Supreme Court.213 To the Ninth Circuit, the
case presented a simple matter of the supremacy of federal law over
state law: since Gibbons v. Ogden, it was well settled that state law
could not interfere with the rights of a federal licensee to exercise
the rights provided by a federal license on a navigable watenvay.214
The Ninth Circuit conceded that the City of Tacoma was a creature
of the State that normally could not act without authorization from
state law. The court of appeals noted, however, that private licen
sees could invoke federal law to preempt state law inconsistent with
the federal license, even when the private licensee - an electrical
co-op - was arguably a creature of state law.215 The court of ap211. The combined cost of the two dams would equal $146 million and generate 465,000
kilowatts of power. The larger dam measured 510 feet from the bedrock and was expected to
inundate 10,000 acres of land as far as 21 miles upstream. See State of Washington Dept. of
Game v. Federal Power Commn., 207 F.2d 391, 393 (9th Cir. 1953); City of Tacoma I, supra
note 4, 262 P.2d at 216-17 (Wash. 1953).
212. See State of Washington Dept. of Game, 207 F.2d at 395.
213. See State of Washington Dept. of Game, 207 F.2d at 398.
214. See State of Washington Dept. of Game, 207 F.2d at 396.
215. See State of Washington Dept. of Game, 207 F.2d at 396.
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peals apparently saw no reason to distinguish between municipal
and private corporations.
While the Ninth Circuit appeal was pending, the Washington
Supreme Court got an opportunity to revisit the issue: the City
filed an action in state court seeking a declaration that the City's
revenue bonds :financing the dams' construction were valid. The
State contested the action on largely the same grounds that it raised
before the FPC, and, after procedural maneuvers too tedious to re
count, the Washington Supreme Court agreed with the State, hold
ing that the State had not conferred the power to condemn the
hatcheries upon the City and that the FPC's effort to confer such
powers on a city would constitute "a momentous and novel" trans
formation of constitutional federalism.216 The State's victory, how
ever, was short-lived: the Supreme Court granted certiorari and
held that the Washington Supreme Court's decision was barred by
the doctrine of res judicata, as the issue of municipal power had
already been litigated before the Ninth Circuit.217
On its surface, therefore, the Tacoma case presents an admira
bly clear conflict between the Ninth Circuit and the Washington
Supreme Court concerning the principle of state supremacy: the
Ninth Circuit apparently rejected the principle, while the Washing
ton Supreme Court embraced it, and the federal tribunal won be
cause its decision came first. But a closer examination of the case
suggests more ambiguous reasoning: the Ninth Circuit's opinion
can be read not so much as rejecting outright the idea of state
supremacy over local governments, but rather as qualifying this
principle with a presumption of local autonomy, a presumption that
makes eminent sense as a matter of doctrine and policy.
To understand the Tacoma case, it is crucial to realize that the
case was about how to construe the state legislature's silence.
Neither the Ninth Circuit nor the Washington Supreme Court held
that any state law expressly prohibited the City of Tacoma from
building its proposed dams. To be sure, the Fish Sanctuary Act pro
hibited all dams that blocked the migrations of salmon.218 But even
the Washington Supreme Court agreed that this state statute was
not intended to govern dams approved by the Federal Power Com
mission.219 The real difference of opinion between the Washington
216. See City of Tacoma II, supra note 19, 307 P.2d at 577.
217. See City of Tacoma Iv, supra note 19, 357 U.S. at 341.
218. See City of Tacoma I, supra note 4, 262 P.2d at 218.
219. The Washington Supreme Court reasoned that this state law did not prevent private
utilities from constructing a dam if the private utility held a federal license to construct the
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Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit rested on whether the
Federal Power Commission could bestow the power to condemn
state-owned land on the City of Tacoma even though state statutes
were _silent on the question of whether the City possessed this
power.
The Washington Supreme Court started from the premise that
" [a] municipal corporation does not have an inherent power of emi
nent domain" and can exercise such a power "only when it is ex
pressly authorized to do so by the state legislature. "220 The court
then concluded that the City of Tacoma lacked the power to con
demn the State's fish hatchery, because no state statute expressly
provided cities with the power to condemn state-owned land. The
court also addressed what it called "the subsidiary question" of
whether federal legislation could bestow eminent domain powers
on the City of Tacoma, even if state law did not do so. In a curi
ously conclusory opinion, the Court asserted that "[t]he Federal
government may not confer corporate capacity upon local units of
government beyond the capacity given them by their creator," be
cause allowing cities to exercise federally derived powers would
"relegate a sovereign state to a position of impotence never con
templated by the framers of our constitutions, state and Federal. "221
The Washington Supreme Court's view that cities could not ex
ercise powers of eminent domain without express state authoriza
tion is not novel: it is merely a narrower version of Dillon's rule the rule that the powers bestowed on municipalities by state legisla
tures ought to be narrowly construed.222 Moreover, one can argue
dam: the state law would be preempted by the federal license governing a navigable water
way. The issue, then, was whether the Fish Sanctuary Act should be construed to prohibit
municipal dams even if federal law preempted its application to private dams. As the dis
senters on the Washington Supreme Court noted, this was a state-law question of severabil
ity, a question that even a majority of the Washington Supreme Court answered in favor of
the City: according to the state supreme court, there was no indication in the Fish Sanctuary
Act that the state legislature intended to place municipalities in a position inferior to private
utilities, by stripping them of powers that the private utilities would continue to enjoy. See
City of Tacoma I, supra note 4, 262 P.2d at 229. Both courts reasoned that, if the Fish Sanctu
ary Act was preempted as to private entities, then purely as a matter of state law, it ought to
be preempted as to municipalities as well.
220. City of Tacoma II, supra note 19, 307 P.2d at 575.
221. City of Tacoma II, supra note 19, 307 P.2d at 577.
222. Dillon's Rule was first formulated by Judge John Dillon, sitting on the Iowa
Supreme Court in City of Clinton v. Cedar Rapids & Mo. R.R., 24 Iowa 455 {1868). Dillon
incorporated the rule in his 1872 treatise on municipal corporations, stating that:
It is a general and undisputed proposition of law that a municipal corporation possesses
and can exercise the following powers and no others: Frrst, those granted in express
words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly
granted; third, those essential to the accomplishment of the declared objects and pur
poses of the corporation.
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that such a narrow construction of municipal power makes sense as
a matter of policy as well as doctrine. The vast majority of munici
palities govern relatively small territorial jurisdictions and therefore
have both the capacity and incentive to impose external costs on
nonresidents

immediately

outside

their

sharply

circumscribed

boundaries. The City of Tacoma, for instance, has an incentive to
construct hydroelectric plants to benefit their own residents even if
these plants destroy fish populations enjoyed by nonresident sports
persons, the fishing industry, and environmentalists.223
Given these well-known dangers of spillover costs, it makes
sense to require some larger jurisdiction - say, the state legislature
- to monitor municipal actions and ensure that they are not efforts
to exploit nonresidents or internal minorities. Dillon's rule and
analogous doctrines serve such a purpose: they require state legis
latures to review each category of municipal action and expressly
authorize it. Of course, such broad rules tend to be crude: they do
not isolate the particular types of municipal actions that tend to re
sult in the greatest injustice. But there is no easy way to define
these actions with judicially manageable rules. Absent such a defi
nition, there is a plausible argument that no local government ought
to be permitted to undertake a category of governmental action un
til the state legislature has reviewed the category to ensure that the
action will not impose unnecessary costs on outsiders.224 So, for
instance, there is a sensible argument for barring the City of Ta
coma from condemning a state-owned fish hatchery until the state
legislature expressly approves such condemnations of state-owned
property.

One simply cannot trust local governments to protect

nonresidents when they condemn state facilities designed to benefit

JOHN DILLON, CoMMENTARIES ON TiiE LAWS OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § '237 (5th ed.
1911). For a discussion of the role that the rule continues to play in city government, see
Richard Briffault, Our Localism (pt. I), 90 CoLUM. L. REv. 1, 8 (1990).
223. Indeed, the laws governing the incorporation of municipalities tend to allow the pro
miscuous creation of municipal corporations even when such incorporation gravely injures
the welfare of persons who are carved out of the cities' boundaries by the incorporators.
224. For a different defense of Dillon's Rule in terms of policy, see Clayton P. Gillette, In
Partial Praise ofDillon's Rule, or, Can Public Choice Theory Justify Local Government Law?,

67 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 959 (1991). Professor Gillette argues that Dillon's Rule is not well
designed to prevent external costs, as it does not distinguish between municipal actions that
impose such costs and those that do not I suggest, however, that there will tend to be a high
correlation between those activities that municipalities have clearest authority to perform
based on state statute and tradition, and those activities that are least likely to impose exter
nal costs. To the extent that a municipality has performed some function uncontroversially
for centuries, it is likely that the activity is one the municipality is well-suited to perform.
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nonresidents until the state legislature has some opportunity to con
sider the issue.225
But this conventional argument against local autonomy does not
resolve the question at issue in Tacoma. The issue is not whether
cities ought to be able to exercise novel powers solely on their own
initiative and without state authorization.

Rather, the issue is

whether the federal government (in the form of the Federal Power
Commission) ought to be permitted to delegate powers to munici
palities without state authorization.

The Washington Supreme

Court did not need to trust the City of Tacoma to police itself: it
need only trust the Federal Power Commission to police the City of
Tacoma.
There are three reasons why one might sensibly allow the fed
eral government to delegate powers to municipalities without ex
press state authorization, even though one might not allow
municipalities to exercise such powers on their own initiative. First,
because the powers must be delegated by either Congress or some
federal agency, burdened nonresidents have an opportunity to pro
tect themselves from the municipal action by lobbying federal offi
cials. Unlike municipal politicians, federal officials receive their
revenue and jurisdiction from Congress, the members of which are
elected from both residents and nonresidents of municipalities.
Nonresidents, therefore, have a preliminary line of defense against
municipal governments' attempting to use a federal delegation of
power to impose spillover costs on nonresidents: they can ask their
congressperson to raise objections with the appropriate federal
agency.
So, for instance, when the City of Chicago entered into an inter
state compact with Gary, Indiana, to build an airport, the project
came under fire from Representative Henry Hyde, a senior repre
sentative of Illinois suburbanites who would be affected by the
noise from the proposed airport's runways.226 Chicago's mayor,
Richard Daley, cannily entered into the interstate compact with
Gary because such a compact would be protected by federal law
from being revoked by the Illinois State Legislature: in effect,
225. The Washington legislature arguably had not had such an opportunity. The Wash
ington Supreme Court had held that cities could condemn state-owned property when such
property was not currently being used by the state for some public purpose. But the court
had never suggested that cities could condemn state-owned property actively used by the
state. See City of Tacoma v. State, 209 P. 700, 701 (Wash. 1922); Roberts v. City of Seattle,
116 P. 25 (Wash. 1911).
226. See Henry J. Hyde, Letter to the Editor, Daley's Airport Gambit Won't Fly, CHI.
TRIB., May 24, 1995.
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Daley hoped to use federal law to liberate Chicago from the con
straints of the (Republican- and suburb-dominated) state govem
ment.227 But, because Congress would have to approve such a
compact, Daley would not be able to impose costs on the suburbs
without at least some oversight by a legislative body - Congress that, in the form of Henry Hyde, represented those suburbs. This is
not to say that such federal oversight is perfect. Indeed, as noted in
section I.B, the premise underlying the principle of state supremacy
is that such oversight is inadequate. Nevertheless, when cities exer
cise delegated federal powers, they exercise powers that have been
screened and debated by the federal representatives of affected
nonresidents. This reduces (but does not eliminate) the possibility
that nonresidents will be unjustly injured.
There is a second reason to permit local governments to exer
cise such federally derived powers without express state authoriza
tion: there is greater need, because the federal government might
need the assistance of the state's subdivisions to prevent the state
itself from imposing interstate spillover effects on persons outside
the state. The federal government, after all, has the constitutional
authority to delegate regulatory powers to cities generally because
such powers address some "substantial effect" that crosses state
boundaries - say, the regulation of interstate waterways or the cre
ation of airports serving interstate travelers.228 If the federal gov
ernment could not make use of municipalities for such purposes
until the state legislature expressly authorized such use, then the
state government's indifference to effects felt outside the state's
boundaries could foreclose federal-local bargains: sheer legislative
inertia might prevent the required state authorization for federal
local action from ever emerging, even when the external costs of
local action were small.229
227. For an overview of the controversy over Daley's effort to protect Chicago's pro
posed airport from state oversight, see Karen Pierog, Chicago, Gary, Ind., Want Illinois Law
suit Thrown Out, BoND BUYER, Aug. 31, 1995, at 5. Illinois's efforts to bar the Gary-Chicago
pact through litigation failed when Federal District Dourt Judge Leinenweber ruled that the
plaintiff, the state of Illinois, failed to state a federal claim and lacked standing. See Illinois
ex rel Edgar v. Chicago, 942 F. Supp. 366, 373-74 (N.D. m. 1996).
228. The most commonly invoked justification for Congress's regulatory power is the
need for federal regulation of activities that impose costs - "substantial effects" - outside
the jurisdiction of the state in which they occur, making regulation of the activities by individ
ual states impractical. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
229. So, for instance, in opposing the proposed airport of the City of Chicago, the State of
Illinois might not have been motivated exclusively by a desire to prevent the City from im
posing external costs of noise on the suburbs. It might also have been motivated by a less
benign desire to exercise exclusive control over the patronage provided by construction con
tracts and jobs.
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Of course, the federal government could stimulate legislative in
terest in the proposed enabling legislation by offering federal
grants-in-aid to state governments that provide the necessary au
thorization to their municipalities. As noted above in section II.A,
state legislatures and governors might act strategically in response
to such offers: they might misrepresent the costs of complying with
federal requests in hopes of reaping a larger amount of federal
grant revenue for themselves. As suggested in section II.B, legal
doctrines, such as Dillon's Rule, that centralize state government
can be expected to exacerbate this tendency toward strategic behav
ior, because such doctrines reduce the intergovernmental competi
tion between state and local governments. Such competition gives
the federal government alternative routes with which to implement
federal law, depriving any nonfederal institution of a "lock" on
nonfederal personnel and policymaking capacity. A default rule
that deprives local governments of the power to act as federal
agents absent express state authorization gives state legislatures
precisely such a monopoly over their local governments.
By giving municipalities a presumptive power to carry out fed
eral policies, the default rule proposed here would mitigate this
danger of overcentralization of state government. This is not to say
that the presumption would prevent the state government from bar
ring local governments from carrying out federal programs. But
such centralization would be much more difficult to achieve: it
would require the state legislature to enact a statute rather than
simply to block a statute from being enacted. There are good rea
sons to believe that the municipalities within a state would find it
easier to lobby to preserve the powers that they presumptively have
than to obtain new powers that are presumptively denied to
them.230 By giving municipalities a presumptive right to act as fed
eral agents, the presumption of institutional autonomy would place
preservation of the federal government's access to a state's local
governments on the agenda of both the state legislature and the
state's municipal lobbying organization: the default rule might well
create an incentive among a state's municipalities to join together
to preserve an existing power even if they would not exert the same
effort to obtain such a power with a new statute. Such a default
rule, in short, makes it easier for the federal government to mobil
ize local governments as proxies for federal interests - a goal that
230. For such an argument, see Samuel lssacharoff & Erica Worth Harris, ls Age Dis
crimination Really Age Discrimination?: The ADEA's Unnatural Solution, 72 N.Y.U. L.
REv.

780, 808-09 (1997).
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may produce significant efficiencies by giving the federal govern
ment multiple nonfederal institutions from which to seek assistance.
The presumption that local governments can serve federal inter
ests serves a third purpose: it acts as a "penalty default," giving
state legislatures an incentive to resolve political disputes about the
costs of local action.231 State legislatures may have an incentive to
avoid political controversies that pit suburbanites against city resi
dents, because any resolution of such struggles invariably entails
electoral risk for at least some state legislators. In order to avoid
this risk, the state legislature may simply adopt a posture of inaction
on the theory that adherence to the status quo will have less chance
of arousing voter hostility. This incentive, however, may prevent
the best decisionmaker from squarely addressing contentious con
flicts that require resolution: there are good reasons to believe that
the state legislature is the institution best suited for resolving such
struggles. This institutional fact, indeed, is what justifies the princi
ple of state supremacy in the first place.
It is useful, therefore, to give the state legislature an incentive to
deliberate (or bargain) about conflicts between residents of differ

ent local governments. A default rule allowing local governments'

action can provide such an incentive, simply because such a rule
disrupts interest groups' settled expectations that might otherwise
be protected through legislative passivity. Interest groups that ben
efit from the status quo have an incentive to lobby the state legisla
ture to prevent the local government's action, while municipalities
(and the interest groups who control them) have an incentive to
preserve the powers bestowed upon them by the default rule. For
instance, the decision in the Tacoma case gives environmentalists,
sport fishing groups, and others interested in salmon hatcheries an
incentive to clarify the rules governing .local governments' powers
to construct hydroelectric plants: rather than rely on a combination
of legislative silence and Dillon's Rule to control the spillover costs
of utilities, they must lobby for a specific statute detailing the types
of municipal actions that they find objectionable. To the extent that
one believes that the state legislature should actively engage in de
bate to resolve such issues, a default rule that allows local govern231. Penalty default rules are rules construing contractual terms against the interest of
the person most capable of changing the rules even when such a construction is inefficient
because the parties would bargain for a different rule. The function of the penalty default is
to give the person most capable of changing the rule an incentive to reveal his or her prefer
ences. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 95-107 (1989).
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ments to alter the status quo might best promote such active
debate.
For these three reasons, a court might favor a default rule pro
moting local governments' autonomy to serve as agents of the fed
eral government even if the court would not adopt such a rule when
the local government acted purely on its own initiative. These con
siderations do not, of course, establish such a default rule as a good
idea. They suggest, however, that the Washington Supreme Court
committed a logical non sequitur in inferring that the City of
Tacoma could not act as a federal licensee from the rule that the
City lacked sufficient state authorization to act without federal au
thorization. State law might well adopt different default rules for
local power depending on whether or not the local government ac
ted pursuant to a federal delegation of power. There is nothing le
gally bizarre about doctrines that allow local governments to
exercise powers pursuant to intergovernmental contracts that such
governments would not be permitted to exercise by themselves.
The so-called "power of one" doctrine, for instance, permits local
governments to engage in activities pursuant to intergovernmental
agreements that such governments would be barred from exercising
on their own initiative.232 The presumption of institutional auton
omy is an analogous "power of one" doctrine for federal-local
relations.
B.

Federal Authorization for Municipal Adjustment of Bonded
Indebtedness: The Case of Bridgeport's Bankruptcy

Like federal licenses to construct dams or airports, municipal
bankruptcy also raises the issue of how the federal government can
dissect the state. Section 109(c)(2) of the federal bankruptcy law
provides that local governments can file a petition seeking protec
tion from their creditors - but only if the local government is "gen
erally authorized" to do so under state law. Bridgeport's 1991
petition for bankruptcy illustrates how contentious this question of
general authorization can be. Over the objection of the
Connecticut government, the federal bankruptcy court held that the
Connecticut State Assembly's general delegation of power to its cit
ies to sue or be sued sufficed to provide Bridgeport with the requi
site authorization. Thus, like the Ninth Circuit in Tacoma, the
232. See AnvisoRY CoMMN. ON lNTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, lNTERGOVERNMEN·
TAL SERVICE ARRANGEMENTS FOR DELIVERING LoCAL PuBLIC SERVICES: UPDATE 1983, at
9 (1985); CHARLES SANDS ET AL., LoCAL GOVERNMENT LAW §§ 6.04, 18.11 (1981); see also
Goreham v. Des Moines Metro. Area Solid Waste Agency, 179 N.W.2d 449, 455 (Iowa 1970).

March 1999]

Dissecting the State

1281

bankruptcy court generously construed the municipality's power to
act pursuant to federal law, effectively allowing Bridgeport to use
federal law to resist the will of the state government.
Did the bankruptcy court err in such a generous construction of
Bridgeport's powers? The question illustrates the statutory ambi
guity endemic to the issue. On one hand, as Michael McConnell
and Randall Picker note, the state statutory framework at issue in

Bridgeport arguably suggested that the state government intended
to occupy the field of municipal debt relief and to preclude munici
pal resort to federal legislation.233 Because Bridgeport's govern
ment had proved incapable of making the politically difficult
taxation and expenditure decisions necessary to curb the City's debt
burden, the Connecticut State Assembly had created a special
agency - the Bridgeport Financial Review Board - to monitor
the City's fiscal decisions, restore the beleaguered city to fiscal sta
bility, and ensure that the City paid off its accumulated debt. To
ward this end, the State Assembly granted the Board wide-ranging
powers to limit the City's fiscal autonomy: the City was required to
submit its budgets to the Board and, if the budget did not meet the
requirements of the state legislation, then the Board was authorized
to reject the budget and promulgate its own budget for the City.234
It is certainly a plausible construction of this statutory scheme that
Connecticut implicitly intended to bar municipal debt avoidance
through resort to federal bankruptcy law - after all, the point of
the state statute was to pay off municipal debts, not default on
them.235
On the other hand, one also can reasonably argue that the State
Assembly's silence on the question of whether Bridgeport had the
power to file under Chapter Nine suggests that the City retained
the power to file its petition. Indeed, the State Assembly consid
ered a statute expressly barring such petitions, but the statute was
not enacted.236 While one must be cautious about drawing ambi
tious inferences from such failure to enact legislation, there is no
obvious reason to believe that a consensus existed in the Connecti
cut General Assembly to forbid Bridgeport from filing a Chapter
233. See Michael W. McConnell & Randall C. Picker, When Cities Go Broke: A Concep
tual Introduction to Municipal Bankruptcy, 60 U. CHI. L. REv. 425, 460 (1993).
234. For a useful statement of the facts in the Bridgeport case, see Dorothy A. Brown,
Fiscal Distress and Politics: The Bankruptcy Filing of Bridgeport as a Case Study in Re
claiming Local Sovereignty, 11 BANKR. DEV. J. 625 (1995).
235. See, e.g., McConnell & Picker, supra note 233, at 458-61.
236. See Rachael E. Schwartz, This Way to the Egress: Should Bridgeport's Chapter 9
Filing Have Been Dismissed?, 66 AM. BANKR. LJ. 103, 127 (1992).
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Nine petition. This statutory silence is not peculiar to Connecticut:
only seventeen states have expressly authorized petitions under
Chapter Nine, and only one state (Georgia) has ever expressly pro
hibited such petitions.237
The important question under section 209(c)(2), therefore, is
how to construe such silence. The presumption of institutional au
tonomy defended in this article sheds some light on this general
question. Contrary to the views of McConnell and Picker, it sug
gests that the Bridgewater Court's ruling makes sense as a matter of
policy, for the same reasons that such a presumption might be a
sensible way to resolve the controversy in Tacoma.
As with municipal eminent domain, it is important to distinguish
between federally authorized municipal actions and municipal ac
tions that the local government takes on its own initiative. There
are respectable reasons to construe narrowly a municipality's power
to avoid its debts when federal authorization is absent, because
there is a danger that cities will use a broad power to impose exter
nal costs on nonresidents. The external costs of projects like dams
and airports are easy to see: as noted above, they can generate
noise, flooding of ecosystems, and loss of valuable fish populations.
But municipal bankruptcy filings also can impose external costs:
one city's filing can increase the borrowing costs for other munici
palities within the same state, as bond purchasers become wary that
other cities might follow the defaulting city's example. Just as state
governments representing all municipalities within its boundaries
may be more likely to consider the costs suffered by persons resid
ing outside the condemning municipality, so too, the state may have
a greater incentive to consider the creditworthiness of the state's
municipalities as a whole.
But two reasons suggest that these considerations apply with
less force when the federal government has authorized the adjust
ment of municipal debt. First, such federal authorization suggests
that municipal debt relief will impose fewer costs on unrepresented
interests: as with federal licensing of dam construction, the federal
government's oversight provides some modest assurance that the
municipality will not impose external costs on neighboring cities.
Congress, after all, represents bondholders and other public credi
tors, such as public employee unions, as well as other public bond
issuers who might fear that one city's default would injure their own
creditworthiness.
237. See id. at 122 n.107.
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Indeed, Congress might be better suited to regulate municipal
debt than the state legislature.

Given that municipal bonds are

traded on a national market, state legislatures might undervalue the
costs of default on municipal obligations: after all, the costs of such
default would be broadly spread among debtors and creditors
throughout the nation while the benefits would be concentrated
among the state's municipalities. Therefore, one might argue that,
to ensure the marketability of municipal bonds throughout the na
tional market, it is essential that there be a federal law protecting
the interests of creditors and adjusting municipal debts in an or
derly fashion.238
Second, as with municipal dams or airports, federal authoriza
tion of municipal debt adjustment may be a useful way to prevent
the state government from abusing its power over local politics for
partisan reasons. As argued in section I.B, state governments are
better suited for monitoring and supervising their municipalities
than the federal government. There is nevertheless a significant
risk that state officials will misuse their control over local govern
ments to maximize their own opportunities for patronage or rent
seeking. The facts of Bridgeport illustrate this danger. The immedi
ate motivation for Bridgeport's Chapter Nine petition was the Fi
nancial Review Board's insistence that the City of Bridgeport raise
property taxes by eighteen percent to cover the costs of the City's
collective bargaining agreements. The City invoked Chapter Nine
largely to obtain an automatic stay of all litigation regarding its con
tracts with its public employee unions - especially litigation con
cerning the Board's order to raise taxes.
On the surface, one might view such state oversight as benign:
the State was sternly demanding that the City honor its obligations
and exercise fiscal responsibility, while the City was apparently cast
in the role of the prodigal municipality, using bankruptcy law to
avoid making politically tough decisions to increase taxes.

The

facts, however, could bear another interpretation. Occurring only
six months before the mayoral elections, the Board's tax hike would
jeopardize the chances of Bridgeport's Republican Mayor, Mary
Moran, to win reelection. This effect may not have been an acci
dent. The Board was composed exclusively of Democrats who had
little political incentive to see Moran reelected: they might have
238. Cf. Michael W. McConnell, Contract Rights and Property Rights: A Case Study in
the Relationship Between Individual Liberties and Constitutional Structure, 76 CAL. L. REv.
267, 286 (1988) (explaining why the Contract Clause limits power of state legislatures but not
power of Congress).
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insisted on the tax increase to ensure the downfall of a political
rival. This interpretation of the Board's action is suggested by one
piece of circumstantial evidence: when Moran was defeated and a
Democratic mayor was elected, the Board dropped its insistence on
a property tax hike and simply made up the City's shortfall with
state assistance.239
In short, it is unclear whether the Financial Review Board's op
position to Bridgeport's petition was judicious state intervention to
alleviate local fiscal irresponsibility or partisan manipulation that
exacerbated Bridgeport's fiscal distress. The presumption of insti
tutional autonomy provides a useful way to resolve such uncertain
ties: by presumptively allowing Bridgeport to take advantage of
federal law, the default rule gives rival interest groups an incentive
to lobby the state legislature and provoke debate on how best to
address municipal debt crises. If there were a genuine danger that
Bridgeport's efforts at debt adjustment would endanger municipal
creditworthiness, then Connecticut's bondholders, underwriters,
public employee unions, and suburban municipalities could be en
listed to bar Chapter Nine petitions. On the other hand, if the
Board opposed Bridgeport's petition simply for reasons of partisan
advantage, then the absence of any public-regarding reason for op
posing debt adjustment under federal law would presumably make
it more difficult to assemble a coalition sufficient to limit municipal
power. Placing the burden of changing the status quo on the oppo
nents of municipal debt adjustment might provide a sensible "pen
alty default," if only because such opponents will, more likely than
not, predominate in the state legislature and have the greatest abil
ity to clarify the law.
In short, the result in Bridgeport can be justified by considera

tions similar to the arguments provided in relation to Tacoma. In
either case, it might be sensible to presume that municipalities can
act pursuant to federal authorization because (1) the need for state
oversight is somewhat reduced by the presence of federal oversight,
and (2) the dangers of excessive state centralization might best be
mitigated by a default rule requiring the state legislature to specify
why the federal government's empowerment of local government is
inefficient. Such a presumption does not overturn the state govern
ment's ultimate power to allocate power among its municipalities.
But it encourages the state government to exercise such power with

239. See Brown, supra note 234, at 637.
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greater regard for the federal government's interests in municipal
autonomy.

IV.

CONCLUSION

The presumption of institutional autonomy and the principle of
state supremacy together define an uneasy balance between
Congress's need to dissect the state into competing nonfederal insti
tutions and the rival need to ensure that nonfederal institutions re
main under the control of state law. On one hand, state lawmakers
- including state constitutional draftspersons - are best situated
to develop institutions for local governance: they ought to have the
final word in creating such institutions. On the other hand, the fed
eral government often needs to< use such institutions: presuming
that such institutions maintain their independence and can compete
with each other to act as agents of Congress helps protect the fed
eral government's access to these institutions.
In effect, the presumption of institutional autonomy operates as
a "plain statement" rule: it does not prevent the state government
from asserting control over nonfederal governmental institutions
but simply demands that such assertions be accompanied by a plain
statement of the evil that such control is intended to avert. So, for
instance, in the context of federal grants-in-aid, the state legislature
cannot simply appropriate funds initially awarded by the federal
government to local governments and governors. Instead, the state
legislature must describe the categories of local or executive action
that it regards as harmful and bar those actions. Likewise, the state
legislature cannot preclude local governments from carrying out
federal policies simply by invoking generalized limits on local
power such as Dillon's Rule. Instead, the state legislature must
specify the category of local actions that the state deems to be too
harmful to permit.
Such a "plain statement" rule serves a purpose analogous to the
various "plain statement" rules invoked by the Court to promote
federalism in cases like

Pennhurst and Gregory v. Ashcroft. Such

federalism-promoting canons of construction are sometimes de
fended as ways of protecting federalism through the national polit
ical process: they encourage members of Congress to consider the
values of federalism and take state powers seriously. The presump
tion of institutional autonomy has an analogous defense. It serves
the purpose of protecting

nationalism through the state govern
ments' political processes: the presumption fragments the state to
facilitate federal use of nonfederal institutions, reducing the neces-
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sity for federal legislation that would violate the principle of state
supremacy.
Tb.is analogy between federalism-promoting canons of construc
tion and nationalism-promoting canons of construction illustrates
an important ambiguity of so-called "political process" theories that
is frequently ignored by commentators and courts who embrace
such theories. Such theories can be deployed on behalf of state
power just as easily as they can be used to vindicate congressional
discretion. It is, of course, possible that the national political pro
cess ensures that the interests of state officials will be sufficiently
respected in the halls of Congress without judicial invalidation of
federal legislation. But it is equally possible that the interests of
Congress will be adequately protected in the halls of state legisla
tures without judicial validation of sweeping federal legislation:
Congress may be able to obtain through agreement what it is
barred from obtaining through outright command. Only by careful
examination of the internal workings of state and local government
can one determine whether outright federal preemption of state
and local powers is really necessary to advance the national inter
est. This article is an attempt to begin this inquiry.

